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  We examine the legal and business environments, financing channels and governance mechanisms of 
various types of firms in India, and compare them to those from other countries.  Despite its English common-
law origin, strong legal protection provided by the law and a democratic government, corruption within India’s 
legal system and government significantly weakens investor protection in practice.  External financing of firms 
has been dominated by non-market sources of financing, while the characteristics of listed firms are similar to 
those from countries with weak investor protection.  Our evidence, including results based on a survey of small- 
and medium-scale private firms, shows that alternative financing channels provide the most important source of 
funds.  We also find that informal governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation, trust and 
relationships, are more important than formal mechanisms (e.g., courts) in resolving disputes, overcoming 
corruption and supporting growth. 
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Understanding mechanisms that contribute to sustainable long-term growth has long been 
one of the central missions for economists.  In recent years, several related strands of literature in 
law, finance and economic growth have significantly advanced our knowledge of growth 
mechanisms.  First, based on large samples of cross-country studies, the law and finance literature 
(pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; LLSV hereafter) finds that 
stronger legal protection of investors is associated with more efficient institutions and better 
financial and economic ‘outcomes’.
1  The second strand of literature champions the view that the 
development of a financial system that includes a stock market and intermediation contributes to a 
country’s overall economic growth (e.g., McKinnon, 1973).
2  The third strand of literature provides 
evidence for the link among law, finance, and growth at the country, industry, and firm level (e.g., 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Levine, 1999; Beck and Levine, 2002).   
Despite the connections from legal origin to institutions to financial and economic outcomes, 
much less is known about the causality of these links.  For example, time series evidence on 
financial development has challenged some of the correlations documented by LLSV (e.g., Rajan 
and Zingales 2003a), while the cost of improving the legal system can be prohibitively high for 
emerging countries.
3  Proponents of institutional development argue that, instead of a country’s legal 
origin, the country’s institutions, in particular, those political economy institutions restraining the 
government and powerful elites, determine the country’s long-run economic growth (e.g., Rajan and 
Zingales 2003b; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005).   
In a recent paper, Allen, Qian and Qian (2005, hereafter AQQ) demonstrate that China 
                                                 
1 LLSV (1998) find that countries with the English common-law origin provide the strongest legal protection to both 
shareholders and creditors, while countries with the French civil-law origin provide the weakest. 
2 Recently, researchers have strengthened this view by presenting supporting empirical evidence at the country level 
(e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998), as well as at the industry and firm level (e.g., Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996). 
3 For example, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (hereafter DMS, 2005) find that, despite apparent significant economic 
benefits from reform, there is very little time variation of creditor rights over the past twenty-five years around the globe.    2 
 
provides a significant counterexample to the findings in the law, institutions, finance and growth 
literature.  Despite its poor legal and financial systems and a corrupt and autocratic government, 
China has (in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms) one of the largest and fastest growing 
economies.  Moreover, AQQ document that alternative financing channels and informal governance 
mechanisms have substituted for formal channels and mechanisms to support corporate as well as 
overall economic growth in China.
4   
In this paper, we examine the second largest emerging economy in the world, India.  At the 
end of 2005, with a population of almost 1.1 billion (second largest behind China), India already has 
the world’s fourth largest economy measured in PPP terms (Table 1-A).  During the period 1990 to 
2005, India’s GDP (in PPP terms) had an annual growth rate of 7.9%, second highest among the 
world’s largest economies.  With India’s English common-law origin, the legal protection of 
investors provided by the law is one of the strongest in the world.  However, widespread corruption 
within India’s legal system and government significantly weakens legal protection in practice.  We 
find that formal external financing for firms has been dominated by non-market sources of funds in 
India, while listed firms behave more like those from countries with weak investor protection.  Our 
evidence, including results based on a survey of small- and medium-scale (private) firms, 
demonstrates that alternative financing channels provide the most important source of funds.  Our 
survey evidence also shows that entrepreneurs and investors rely more on informal governance 
mechanisms, such as those based on reputation, trust and relationships, than formal mechanisms to 
resolve disputes, overcome corruption and finance corporate growth.   
Our results, along with the findings of AQQ (2005) on China, illustrate that alternative 
financing channels and informal governance mechanisms, rather than legal protection and political 
                                                 
4 The literature on economies of transition (from Socialist, central planning systems to market-based economies) also 
documents the important role of alternative mechanisms in promoting the development of markets and institutions (e.g., 
McMillan, 1997; McMillan and Woodruff, 2002).   3 
 
institutions (e.g., lack of government corruption) documented in most of the existing literature, have 
supported the growth of non-government firms in these two countries.  As of 2005, they have a 
combined population of 40% of the entire world, and their combined GDPs (in PPP terms) are 
almost as large as that of the U.S. and equal to 19% of the world total.  Given the status of these two 
countries, our findings call for more research in order to better understand whether similar 
“substitute” mechanisms that have worked well in China and India have also supported the growth 
of firms in other economies where formal mechanisms are not available. 
We first find that India, a long-time British colony, has the best investor protection on paper.  
India has a perfect score on the Creditor Rights index (4 out of 4),
5  and scores 5 out of 6 for the 
Anti-Director Rights index, the highest among more than 100 countries studied in Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2005; hereafter DLLS).  Moreover, India has had a British-
style judicial system and a democratic government for a long time.  However, wide-spread 
government corruption and overburdened courts lead to poor legal protection in practice.
6  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, India’s stock market has not played a dominant role in resource allocation and 
providing external financing to firms.  External financing through financial markets (equity and 
bond) has been dominated by banking and alternative sources, although the size and importance of 
the stock markets have grown significantly in recent years.  Since the deregulation and financial 
liberalizations in the early 1990s, the entry and competition from non-state owned banks have 
stimulated the growth of the banking sector, which has maintained a low level of non-performing 
loans (NPLs) and a high level of efficiency in part due to stringent lending standards. 
We next separately examine financing channels, corporate governance, and the growth of 
three groups of firms.  First, the importance of the state sector (public sector undertakings, or PSUs) 
                                                 
5 This score was revised from 4/4 in LLSV (1998), which was based on the Company’s Act (1956), to 2/4 in DMS 
(2005), which was based on the Sick Industrial Companies Act (1985).  
6 DLLS (2005) construct the anti-self-dealing index (control of corporate insiders) for more than 100 countries.  India’s 
score of 0.55 (out of 1) is lower than the average (0.67) of English common-law countries.   4 
 
in the economy has been decreasing relative to non-state sectors, even though as a group PSUs have 
been growing at comparable rates to the non-state sector.  The reason is there is an ongoing 
privatization process in the state sector, including selected PSUs being publicly listed.  Second, our 
empirical results on listed firms of the non-state sector are based on a sample of more than 850 firms 
over the period 1995 - 2004.  We find that the equity ownership is highly concentrated within the 
founder’s family and/or the controlling shareholder.  These findings are similar to those for other 
Asian countries (e.g., Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang 2002).  
When compared to listed firms studied in LLSV (2000b, 2002), both the dividend ratio and valuation 
of Indian firms are much lower compared to similar firms operating in countries with strong investor 
protection, but similar to those listed firms in countries with weak protection.   
More interesting results are found for the non-state, non-listed firms, and in particular, small- 
and medium-sized firms.  These firms have grown faster than the rest of the economy during the past 
15 years, while the financing of this sector is clearly different from the state and listed firms.  Due to 
the lack of publicly available firm-level data, our evidence, by necessity, is mainly based on a survey 
of 213 entrepreneurs and executives of firms located in and around the southern Indian city of 
Hyderabad (76 firms) and the Delhi-Gurgaon area of northern India (136 firms).  Our survey firms 
operate in manufacturing industries with firms ranging in age from less than a year to 85 years (the 
median is 21 years).  These firms employ two to 350 workers (the median is ten). 
In about 85% of the firms surveyed, the largest owner is the founder’s family, while over half 
of the firms have unlimited liability.  When asked how the owners (with unlimited liability) would 
protect their personal assets in case of business failure, 151 out of 157 respondents would negotiate 
with lenders for an extension; only 22 respondents said they would also file personal bankruptcy.  
The three most important financing channels for these firms during their start-up and growth periods 
are founders’ family and friends, trade credits and loans from financial institutions, including state-  5 
 
owned banks and banks specialized in lending to small- and medium-sized firms (e.g. the Small 
Industry Development Bank of India, or SIDBI, and State Financial Corporations, or SFCs).  
However, credit availability is not uniform across the surveyed firms, and the market for bank credit 
is clearly relationship-driven.  Over 70% of the respondents said that their firms had to meet 
operating/profitability criterion to obtain their largest loans, while the median “monitoring” 
frequency of the banks (bank staff contacting borrower about the loan) is once per quarter.        
We also find that informal governance mechanisms based on trust, reputation and 
relationships are much more important than legal remedies in resolving disputes and enforcing 
contracts.  For example, when asked about the consequences of delay of (or non-)payments and 
breach of contracts, the respondents ranked loss of future business opportunities, reputation and 
personal assets as main concerns, while fear of legal remedies was the least important.  When asked 
who would be the best mediator for disputes (multiple choices allowed), 46% of the respondents 
specify “mutual friends and business partners” and 26% specify a non-government organization like 
a trade association as their choice, and only 20% of respondents choose “going to courts.”  When 
asked how a firm ensures payments, 53% of the respondents screen their business partners carefully 
so that such issues do not occur, while 59% said they would go to courts but would leave negotiation 
possibilities open.  Finally, when asked about government regulatory authorities (e.g., obtaining a 
license to start a business), our survey indicate corruption is part of doing business.  The two most 
common methods to overcome corruption are bribes and using friends of government officials. 
Our paper extends the literature on law, institutions, finance and growth.  Many cross-
country studies focus on one or two dimensions of a country’s legal and financial systems, and treat 
each country in their sample on an equal-weight basis.  We might expect that, compared to large and 
diverse countries (e.g., India and China), small homogeneous economies (e.g., Hong Kong and 
Singapore) could have more effective legal and financial institutions because they can be tailored to   6 
 
these countries’ needs at low costs.
7  By contrast, this paper studies all aspects of the financial 
system in the second largest developing country and finds that many results based on existing cross-
country studies to a large degree do not apply to India.  Our paper thus complements cross-country 
studies, and can further advance the understanding of growth mechanisms. 
We also utilize surveys to examine small- and medium-scale private firms, which is one of 
the most vibrant corporate sectors in India.  Survey-based research has made significant 
contributions to the law, institutions, finance and growth literature.
8  In particular, the World Bank 
has carried out a series of country- and firm-level surveys on the business environment in more than 
80 countries, including both India and China (e.g., Cull and Xu 2005).  Our survey differs from the 
World Bank surveys in two ways.  First, the main goal of the World Bank surveys is to examine the 
degree of “convergence” of institutional development in emerging countries toward institutions in 
developed countries (in particular, the U.S.), while our goal is to uncover and analyze factors that 
can be effective for extended periods in supporting firm- and economy-wide growth.  Second, our 
surveys provide the most comprehensive and detailed information on all the financing channels 
(standard and alternative) and governance mechanisms (formal and informal) at different stages of 
non-state, non-listed firms, which have been generally overlooked in the literature.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides background information on 
India, and Section III describes the size and growth of the different sectors of the Indian economy.  
In Section IV, we examine the financing patterns, valuation, and dividend policies of firms in the 
Listed Sector.  Section V presents our survey results of small- and medium-scale firms.  Finally, 
Section VI concludes.  Appendix A contains the explanations of all the variables used in the paper. 
                                                 
7 Moreover, Stulz (2005) argues that there are limits to globalization, including the improvement of institutions, due to a 
“twin” agency problem of governments and corporate insiders in emerging countries. 
8 For example, DLLS (2003) conduct worldwide surveys on the efficiency of judicial systems, while Johnson, McMillan, 
and Woodruff (2002) conduct firm-level surveys in economies of transition on property rights and finance.   7 
 
II.  India: An Overview 
Home to the second largest population in the world (1.08 billion as of 2004), India currently 
has the fourth largest economy in PPP terms, and is closing in at the heels of the third largest 
economy, Japan (Table 1-A).  The largest democracy in the world with a press as free and vocal as 
anywhere else, it is relatively conservative in social mores by Western standards and considerably 
more so in rural areas where over 70% of the population resides.  The birthplace of at least three 
major religions, India is replete with Buddhist, Islamic and Western influences though Hinduism is 
the dominant faith today.  With 25 major languages and over a hundred dialects, India defies 
generalizations.  An illiteracy rate of 35% co-exists with a crowd of information technology 
professionals and a young English-speaking urban workforce competing for service sector jobs with 
their U.S. counterparts.  Despite its rising economic might, a third of its population languishes in 
terrible poverty.  In short, India is as large and diverse as any other country in the world.  Table 1-B 
provides a snapshot of India’s socio-economic conditions. 
II.1  The Indian Economy – A Historical Perspective 
At independence from the British in 1947, India inherited one of the world’s poorest 
economies (the manufacturing sector accounted for only one-tenth of the national product), but also 
one with arguably the best formal financial markets in the developing world.  It had four functioning 
stock exchanges (the oldest one predating the Tokyo Stock Exchange) with clearly defined rules 
governing listing, trading and settlements; a well-developed equity culture if only among the urban 
rich; and a banking system with well-developed lending norms and recovery procedures.  In terms of 
corporate laws and financial system, India emerged far better endowed than most other erstwhile 
colonies.  The 1956 Indian Companies Act, as well as other laws governing the functioning of joint-
stock companies and protecting the investors’ rights, were built on this foundation.   8 
 
Corporate development in India had begun with the managing agency system. It led to more 
dispersed equity ownership but also gave rise to the practice of management enjoying control rights 
disproportionately greater than their stock ownership.
9  India’s turn towards socialism after 
independence put in place a regime and culture of licensing, protection and widespread red-tape that 
bred corruption and stilted the growth of corporate sectors.  Heavy industries and strategic sectors 
were off-limits for private enterprise – the state had to control the “commanding heights” of the 
economy.  Two rounds of nationalization brought about 90% of the banking sector under 
government control.  On the other hand, to promote employment as well as to pay homage to 
Mahatma Gandhi’s vision of village self-sufficiency, India restricted several areas for the “small 
scale sector”, where individual businesses could not grow beyond a certain size.  Formal non-state 
enterprises, such as joint-stock corporations, were severely restricted to a middle area between these 
two sectors, subject to the “License Raj” where government permission was required for an 
unending and ever-increasing list of business decisions.  Corruption, nepotism and inefficiency 
became the hallmarks of the Indian corporate sectors.  Exorbitant tax rates encouraged creative 
accounting practices and complicated compensation structures designed to beat the system.  
The economy reached the end of this road in 1990-91 with a severe balance of payments 
crisis, threatening a default in India’s foreign debt payments.  While some reforms (more “business-
friendly”) had begun in the early and mid-1980s, this crisis, and the conditions imposed by the IMF 
assistance package that followed, ushered in an era of reforms.  As in many other countries around 
the globe, this constituted deregulation, liberalization of the external sector and partial privatization 
of some of the state sector enterprises.  In many ways the reforms that started in 1991 have 
transformed the economy through the twin forces of globalization and competition. 
                                                 
9 The Managing Agency System was a corporate governance system that existed in British India, where the Board of 
Directors would hire a "Managing Agency" to run the company.  These agencies often ran companies in various 
industries and practically controlled massive conglomerates.  The system was abolished in 1970.   9 
 
For over three decades after independence, India grew at an average rate of 3.5% (infamously 
labeled “the Hindu rate of growth”) and then accelerated to an average of about 5.6% since the 
1980s.  As we have seen in Table 1-A, the annual growth rate of 7.9% during 1990-2005 is the 
second highest among the world’s largest economies, behind only China’s 11.8%.  
In 2004, 52% of India’s GDP was generated in the services sector, while manufacturing 
(agriculture) produced 26% (22%) of GDP.  In terms of employment, however, agriculture accounts 
for about two-thirds of the half a billion labor force, indicating both poor productivity and 
widespread underemployment.  Over 90% of the labor force works in the “unorganized sector.”
10 
II.2  Law, Institutions and Business Environment 
The most striking fact about India’s legal system is the difference between protection of 
investors by law as opposed to protection in practice.  Table 2 (panels A through E) compares 
India’s scores relative to the world, different legal-origin country groups, and other emerging 
markets on several different dimensions of law and institutions.  As discussed above, with the 
English common-law system, India has strong protection of investors “on paper”:  The scores on 
both creditor rights (Table 2-B, with a score of 4/4 in LLSV (1998), based on the Company’s Act of 
1956, to 2/4 in DMS (2005), based on the Sick Industrial Companies Act of 1985) and shareholder 
rights (5/6 in Table 2-C) are the highest of any country in the world.   
Table 2-D compares law enforcement and the quality of institutions in India and LLSV 
countries, while Table 2-E provides similar comparisons among major emerging economies.  We did 
not use the measures from LLSV (1998) because they are dated and do not accurately capture the 
current protection of investors in India.  We employ four sets of up-to-date and widely used 
measures for our purpose.  First, the legal formalism (DLLS 2003) index, based on extensive surveys 
                                                 
10 According to the official definition, the unorganized sector is comprised of: 1) all the enterprises except units 
registered under Section 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948, and Bidi and Cigar Workers (condition of 
employment) Act, 1966; and 2) all enterprises except those run by the government (central, state and local bodies) or 
Public Sector Enterprises.     10 
 
of lawyers and judges, measures how efficiently the courts of a country enforce contracts.  DLLS 
have constructed measures based on how courts handle two types of cases: Collection of a bounced 
check, and eviction of a (non-paying) tenant.  A higher score in either category implies that the court 
system is slower (with more bureaucracy) and less efficient.  We took the average of these (highly 
positively correlated) indexes to construct a single formalism index.  From Table 2-D, India’s has a 
higher formalism index than the average of English origin countries, and is only lower than that of 
the French origin countries.   
Second, measures on government corruption used in Tables 2-D and 2-E come from 
Transparency International’s survey-based annual reports, which provide the most comprehensive 
examination of corruption within the government and legal institutions around the world.  Based on 
its 2005 Corruption Perception Index, India has a score of 2.9 out of 10 (a higher score means less 
corruption), which ranked 88th out of 140 countries (with the range of scores from 1.5 to 9.7).  In the 
2003 survey, India had a score of 2.8/10 and ranked 95th out of 145 countries.  From Table 2-E, 
India’s corruption score is below that of China, Brazil and Mexico, all of which have much weaker 
legal protection of investors, and is only ahead of Pakistan (Argentina has a score of 2.8).
11  Further, 
in its survey of investment climates around the world, the World Bank (World Development Report 
2005) found that corruption was the number one constraint for firms in South Asia.  Another survey 
by the same organization, “Corruption in South Asia in 2002” found that the two most corrupt public 
institutions identified by the respondents in India (as well as in most countries in South Asia) were 
the police and the judiciary.  
Third, we have two measures for the quality of accounting systems.  The disclosure 
requirements index (from 0 to 1, higher score means more disclosure; LLS 2006) measures the 
extent to which listed firms have to disclose their ownership structure, business operations and 
                                                 
11 For more information on the cross-country and time series of corruption scores, go to the website of Transparency 
International http://www.transparency.org/publications/annual_report.   11 
 
corporate governance mechanisms to legal authorities and the public.  India’s score of 0.92 is higher 
than the averages of all LLSV subgroups of countries, including the English origin countries, 
suggesting that Indian firms must disclose a large amount of information.  However, this does not 
imply the quality of disclosure is also good.  In terms of the degree of earnings management (higher 
score means more earnings management; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003), India’s score is much 
higher than the average of English origin countries, and is only lower than the German origin 
countries, suggesting that investors have a difficult time in evaluating Indian companies based on 
publicly available reports.   
The fourth and last category of Table 2-D is the legality index, a composite measure of the 
effectiveness of a country’s legal institutions.  It is based on the weighted average of five categories 
of the quality of legal institutions and government in the country (see Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard 
2003).  Consistent with other measures, India’s score is lower than the averages of all the subgroups 
of LLSV countries, suggesting that India’s legal institutions are less effective than those of many 
countries, and that it will be more difficult for India to adopt and enforce new legal rules and 
regulations than other countries.    
Finally, as for the business environment in India, a recent World Bank survey found that, 
among the top ten obstacles to Indian businesses, the three which the firms surveyed considered to 
be a “major” or “very severe” obstacle and exceeding the world average are corruption (the most 
important problem), availability of electricity, and labor regulations.  Threat of nationalization or 
direct government intervention in business is no longer a major issue in India.  With rampant tax 
evasion, the shadow economy in India is significant. It is estimated to be about 23% of GDP.
12  In 
keeping with its socialist moorings during the first three decades after independence, India created a 
                                                 
12 This figure is 22.4% according to Schneider and Enste (2000), and 23.1% by Schneider (2002) (World Bank). Popular 
perception, however, would put it significantly larger, particularly given that the average figure of OECD countries 
themselves is about 12%.    12 
 
panoply of laws as well as government departments to monitor and control the private sector on the 
one hand, and to promote and finance small enterprises through government assistance on the other.  
Creditor and investor rights were largely unprotected in practice, with banks having little bargaining 
power against willful defaulters.  Large corporate houses often got away with default, or got poor 
projects financed through the state-owned banking sector, often by using connections with 
influential politicians and bureaucrats.      
To summarize, despite strong protection provided by the law, legal protection is considerably 
weakened in practice due to an inefficient judicial system, characterized by overburdened courts, 
slow judicial process, and widespread corruption within the legal system and government. 
II.3  The Financial Sector 
Despite the history of India’s stock markets and large number of listed firms, the size and 
role in terms of allocating resources of the markets are dominated by those of the banking sector, 
similar to many other emerging economies.  From Table 3-A, total bank deposits (of over $385 
billion dollars) are equivalent to 50% of GDP in 2003, and constitute three-quarters of the country’s 
total financial assets.  The efficiency of the banking sector, measured by the concentration and 
overhead costs, is ahead of the world average.  On the other hand, total capitalization of the stock 
market is 34% of GDP, while the size of the (private) corporate bond market is miniscule. 
In Table 3-B we compare India’s financial system (2003 figures) to those of the LLSV-
sample countries (LLSV, 1997a, 1998), using measures from Levine (2002).  In terms of the size 
(bank private credit over GDP), India’s banking sector is much smaller than the (value-weighted) 
average of LLSV sample countries, even though its efficiency (overhead cost as fraction of total 
banking assets) compares favorably to most countries.  The size of India’s stock market, measured 
by the total market capitalization as fraction of GDP, is actually slightly larger than that of the 
banking sector, although this figure is still below the LLSV average.  However, in terms of the   13 
 
“floating supply” of the market, or the tradable fraction of the total market capitalization, India’s 
stock market is only half of its banking sector.
13  “Structure activity” and “Structure size” measure 
whether a financial system is dominated by the market or banks.  India’s activity (size) figure is 
below (above) even the average of English origin countries, suggesting that India has a market-
dominated system; but this is mainly due to the small amount of bank private credit (relative to 
GDP) rather than the size of the stock market.  In terms of relative efficiency (“Structure efficiency”) 
of the market vs. banks, India’s banks are much more efficient than the market (due to the low 
overhead cost), and this dominance of banks over market is stronger in India than for the average 
level of LLSV countries.  Finally, in terms of the development of the financial system, including 
both banks and markets, we find that India’s overall financial market size (“Finance activity” and 
“Finance size”) is much smaller than the LLSV-sample average level.  Overall, based on the above 
evidence, we can conclude that both India’s stock market and banking sector are small relative to the 
size of its economy, and the financial system is dominated by an efficient (low overhead cost) but 
significantly under-utilized (in terms of lending to non-state sectors) banking sector.   
Financial Markets 
The number of India’s stock exchanges has grown from four at Independence (1947) to 23 
today.  India also boasts the largest number of listed companies in the world – well over 10,000.  
However, the equity markets were not important as a source of funding for the non-state sector until 
as recently as the early 1980s.  Before then, the Indian capital markets were a closed club of brokers 
with few primary market offerings and little trade and marginal participation of the common public, 
a state of affairs caused mostly by the lack of transparency in Indian businesses and little protection 
of minority shareholders.  The ratio of India’s market capitalization to GDP rose from about 3.5% in 
                                                 
13 We estimate that 45% of the total market capitalization of listed firms is actively traded in India, and hence a value 
traded/GDP ratio of 0.16.  The float supply figure of 45% is based on our own calculation of free float adjustment factor 
of about 1,000 large firms listed on the BSE (small firms are less frequently traded than large firms).     14 
 
the early 1980’s to over 34% in 2003, which ranks 41
st among 89 countries (Table 3-A).   
However, the situation has changed considerably in recent years: Since the middle of 2003 
through the first quarter of 2006, Indian stock prices have appreciated rapidly, with the popular 
Sensex index rising from about 3000 to over 10,000 in a period of less than three years.  In fact, as 
shown in Figure 1, the rise of the Indian equity market in this period allowed investors to earn a 
higher return (“buy and hold return”) from investing in the Mumbai Stock Exchange (formerly the 
Bombay Stock Exchange, or BSE) Index than from investing in the S&P 500 Index and other indices 
in the U.K., China, and Japan during the period 1992-2005.  Many credit the continuing reforms and 
more or less steady growth as well as increasing foreign direct and portfolio investment in the 
country for this explosion in share values.
14     
Table 3-C shows the comparative position of the two major Indian exchanges (the NYSE-
type “floor exchange”, the BSE, and the NASDAQ-type electronic exchange, National Stock 
Exchange, (NSE)) vis-à-vis other major exchanges in the world.  At the end of 2004, BSE was the 
sixteenth largest stock market in the world in terms of market capitalization, while NSE ranked next 
at seventeenth.  Table 3-C also shows that trading in the BSE is the most concentrated among the 
largest exchanges in the world, with the top 5% of companies (in terms of market capitalization) 
accounting for close to 90% of all trades, but the (share) turnover velocity of BSE (43.1% for the 
year) is much lower than that of exchanges with similar concentration ratios.  These results are 
consistent with our prior conclusion that the majority of shares in the BSE are not frequently traded.  
By contrast, the trading patterns at the NSE are similar to those of NASDAQ with more stocks 
actively and frequently traded (lower concentration ratio and higher turnover velocity).
15  
                                                 
14 According to the Reserve Bank of India’s Handbook of Indian Statistics, both foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment (in stocks and bonds) have been growing fast during the past 15 years, with the latter twice the size of the 
former. The cumulative foreign investment inflows equals 11.58% of GDP in 2005, as compared to 0.03% in 1990.     
15 Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices are more synchronous in emerging countries than in developed countries. 
They contribute this phenomenon to poor minority investor protection and imperfect regulation of markets in emerging   15 
 
In 2004-05, non-government Indian companies raised about 2.7 billion USD from the market 
through the issue of common stock, and US$378 million by selling bonds/debentures (no preferred 
shares were issued).  Despite the size of the new issuance, Indian’s financial markets, relative to the 
size of its economy and population, are much smaller than those in many other countries.  Table 3-D 
presents a comparison of external markets (stock and bonds) in India and different country groups 
(by legal origin) using measures from LLSV (1997a).  Figure 2 plots the size and depth of a 
country’s external markets vs. the degree of protection of investors based on data in Table 3-D.  The 
horizontal axis measures overall investor protection (protection provided by the law, rule of law, and 
government corruption) in each country, while the vertical axis measures the (relative) size and 
efficiency of that country’s external markets.
16  Most countries with English common-law systems 
(French civil-law systems) lie in the top-right region (bottom-left region) of the graph.  India is 
located in the south-eastern region of the graph with relatively strong legal protection (in particular, 
protection provided by law) but relatively small financial markets. 
Banking Sector  
Over the decades, India’s banking sector has grown steadily in size, measured in terms of 
total deposits, at a fairly uniform average annual growth rate of about 18%.  There are about 100 
commercial banks in operation with about 30 state owned banks, about 30 private sector banks and 
over 40 foreign banks.  Still massively dominated by state-owned banks (they account for over 80% 
of deposits and assets),  the years since liberalization have seen the emergence of new private sector 
banks as well as the entry of several new foreign banks.  This has resulted in a much lower 
concentration ratio in India than in other emerging economies (Table 3-A, and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
markets. While stock prices in India co-move less frequently than those in China (one of the worst in the world), they are 
much more synchronous than those in the developed markets such as the U.S.   
16 Following LLSV, the score on the horizontal axis is the sum of (overall) creditor rights, shareholder rights, rule of law, 
and government corruption. The score of the vertical axis indicates the distance of a country’s overall external markets 
score (external cap/GNP, domestic firms/Pop, IPOs/Pop, Debt/GNP, and Log GNP) to the mean of all countries, with a 
positive (negative) figure indicating that this country’s overall score is higher (lower) than the mean.    16 
 
Levine 2001).  Competition has clearly increased with the Herfindahl index (a measure of 
concentration) for advances and assets dropping by over 28% and about 20% respectively between 
1991-1992 and 2000-2001 (Koeva 2003).  Within a decade of its formation, a private bank, the 
ICICI Bank has become the second largest bank in India.  
While the problem of NPLs does exist for some public sector banks (also a “new” private 
sector bank almost collapsed in 2003 when it was bailed out by merging with another bank), 
compared to most Asian countries the Indian banking system has done better in managing this 
problem.  The “healthy” status of the Indian banking system is in part due to its high standards in 
selecting borrowers (in fact, many firms complained about the stringent standards and lack of 
sufficient funding), though there is some concern about “ever-greening” of loans to avoid being 
categorized as NPLs.  Table 3-E provides comparative statistics on this issue.  In terms of 
profitability, Indian banks have also performed well compared to the banking sector in other Asian 
economies, as the returns to bank assets and equity in Table 3-F convey. 
We close this section by emphasizing three facts about the Indian society and economy.  
First, a large and diverse country, India has had recent success in its overall economic development.  
Second, despite strong investor protection purportedly provided by the law, actual protection is weak 
in India owing to the inefficiency of legal institutions and corruption.  Third, despite the 
development and growth of India’s financial system (both banking sector and markets), its size is 
small relative to the economy while its roles of resource allocation and provider of external 
financing are expected to become much more important in the near future.     
III.  Aggregate Evidence on India’s Corporate Sectors: Organization, Financing and Growth 
Since Independence India has sought to follow a “mixed economy” model with co-existing 
state and non-state sectors.  In reality, the next four decades saw the widening and strengthening of 
the state sector with simultaneous crippling of the non-state sectors through severe controls,   17 
 
including limits to investment and industrial licensing.  During the last decade and a half of 
liberalization, initiated in 1992, the non-state sectors have gained some long-overdue momentum.  
Before we compare the scale and growth of various sectors, some clarifications on the definitions of 
corporate sectors are in order.  First, the state sector comprises of PSUs, in which the government 
has majority (at least 50%) ownership and control.  Second, the Companies Act (1956) of India 
defines a ‘public’ company as a (non-state) company that has a minimum paid-up capital of Indian 
rupees (Rs.) 500,000 (US$ 11,100) and more than 50 shareholders.  A fraction of the 76,621 public 
companies (more than 10,000) are listed and publicly traded on one or more of the exchanges.  
Third, the rest of the (smaller) registered, non-state companies with less than 50 shareholders are 
called ‘private’ companies.  Finally, there is the unorganized sector that consists of firms that are not 
PSUs, public or private companies. 
A focus of our paper is small- and medium-scale private firms.
17  The official definition of a 
firm in the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector is one that has investments in fixed assets of 
plant and machinery less than Rs. 50 million (US$ 1.11 million, at original cost).  The SME sector 
includes the Small Scale Industry (SSI) sector, where a (mostly manufacturing) firm has fixed assets 
less than Rs. 10 million (US$ 222,000), and the medium sector, where firms’ fixed assets range from 
Rs. 10 to 50 million.  Largely to create greater employment since independence, the government has 
sought to “protect” certain industries from large scale, capital intensive companies by establishing 
investment limits to define this sector.  For example, the production of certain products is 
exclusively reserved for the SSI units.
18  Non-manufacturing small enterprises with less than Rs. 1 
                                                 
17 The importance of small and medium private firms is hardly unique to India -- high-growth economies are typically 
marked by such a vibrant sector. Using a sample of 76 countries (India not included), Beck et al. (2005) find a strong 
association between the importance of SMEs and GDP per capita growth.  However, they are not able to establish that 
SMEs exert a causal impact on growth or poverty reduction. 
18 Currently the production of 506 items, most of which are consumer products and food, are reserved exclusively for 
SSIs. For a complete list, visit this website:  http://www.smallindustryindia.com/publications/reserveditems/resvex.htm.    18 
 
million (US$ 22,000) investment in plant and machinery are classified as the Small Scale Service 
and Business Enterprises (SSSBE).   
Table 4 presents comparisons of state and non-state sectors during the period 1990-2003.  
Within the non-state sectors we focus on the sector of public and private companies (non-state 
corporations) and the SSI Sector, a subset of the SME sector.  First, in terms of the size of the labor 
force, the SSI dominates the other sectors:  With an annual growth rate of almost 4%, the size of the 
labor force in the SSI sector as of 2003 was 19.97 million as compared to 8.50 million for the state 
sector.  In fact, the actual employment number in small firms is actually much larger than the 
reported figure of 19.97 million, which does not include all the (non-agriculture) firms and their 
employees in the unorganized sector (as explained above, firms in the unorganized sector are not 
PSUs, public or private companies).  Second, in terms of the size and growth of the output of the 
sectors, we can see that all sectors have been growing fast, while the annual growth rate of output in 
the SSI sector (9.8%; data on the output of all firms in the non-state sectors not available) is higher 
than that of the state-sector (8.5%).  In terms of contribution to GDP, the size of the state-sector 
(excluding government spending) has been around one fifth of the non-state sectors (excluding 
agriculture) during 1990-2003.
19  Third, in terms of fund raising and investment, non-state sectors 
have also been growing faster than the state sector.  During 1990-2003, total paid-up capital in the 
state sector grew at an annual rate of 3.37%, with its share in the total declining from 73% to 28%.  
By contrast, paid-up capital in non-state corporations (including listed firms) has been growing at an 
annual rate of 21.51%.
20     
                                                 
19 Among non-state sectors, we find that firms operating in the services industries (e.g., commerce & hotels, community 
& business services) had surpassed traditional manufacturing industries in terms of number of units and investments. 
20 Paid-up capital is the actual amount that investors have paid for the share capital (excluding retained earnings), and 
equals to the sum of face value and share premium. For PSUs, equity investors include the government and non-
government investors, while for non-state (public and private) firms paid-up capital includes equity capital raised from 
the stock market (for listed firms) and private equity.     19 
 
Table 5 provides evidence on the sources of (new) funds for non-financial Indian firms 
during the 14-year period of 1991-2004, based on the Prowess database of the Centre for Monitoring 
the Indian Economy (CMIE).  The firm categories (among the firms in the non-state sectors) are not 
always mutually exclusive but they show the breakdown between listed and unlisted firms, and, in 
the small-scale sector, between manufacturing (SSI) and services (SSSBE) sectors.
21  For all firms in 
the state and non-state sectors, the most important source of funds is “internal sources” (e.g., 
retained earnings) accounting for over one-third of all sources.  However, the most striking finding 
from the table is the importance of short-term financing through trade credits, other current liabilities 
and provisions, reflected in the “Others” category.  Across all firm categories short-term sources on 
an average accounted for close to 30% of all sources of funds.  The importance of this source 
increases dramatically in the small scale segment accounting for over half and almost two-thirds of 
all financing for the SSI and SSSBE sectors, respectively.  Since many firms in the SSSBE sector are 
engaged in wholesale and retail trade and with current liabilities playing an important role in 
financing and business activities, this finding is perhaps not too surprising.  
The overall marginal debt-equity ratio, with debt equaling the sum of “debt” and “borrowing 
from banks or intermediaries” (part of this category may be short-term in nature) comes out to be 
approximately 1.5.  Firms in the two small-scale sectors have negligible debt in their marginal 
capital structure.  Firms in the state sector have the highest marginal leverage (over 1.8), followed by 
listed companies, unlisted companies, and small scale sector firms in that (expected) order.  While 
there has been considerable temporal variation in the relative importance of individual sources of 
financing in the last decade and a half, the overall patterns noted above remain unaltered.  Overall, 
the results shown in Table 5 are largely consistent with the findings of Love et al. (2004), who find 
                                                 
21 The numbers in the table are flow variables. For a certain type of firm, the percentages reported in the table are 
obtained by first calculating the percentage of total new funds in a given year for each funding source and then by taking 
the average from 1990 through 2004. CMIE is a Mumbai-based economic and business information and research 
organization.     20 
 
evidence of stronger credit constraints for smaller (and younger) firms.  Our results are also 
generally consistent with those from the Reserve Bank of India (2005).
22  
The patterns above appear to suggest that external long-term finance has remained an 
important bottleneck in Indian industry, particularly for the SME sector.  Recent studies by other 
researchers have found evidence of “under-lending” by Indian banks to the corporate sector.  Under-
lending is present when the marginal rupee lent to a borrower yields a higher marginal product than 
its interest cost.
23  Banerjee and Duflo (2003) find that, even after six years of liberalization, bank 
credit was scarce while interest rates, though high by world standards, appeared to be under the 
equilibrium levels.  It is a system-wide feature, indicating that companies cannot get adequate credit, 
not just from a single bank but from the banking system in general.  In many countries, the SME 
sector faces impediments to bank financing, and depends heavily on short-term borrowing.
24  India 
perhaps presents a rather extreme example of this phenomenon, with the SME sector facing a severe 
shortage of financing.  About 50% of the respondents in a recent National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO) survey said that they faced an acute shortage of capital.
25  The mean loan 
outstanding was less than 3% of gross fixed asset (at market prices).  About 93% of SME units had 
no outstanding loans from banks or financial institutions.  About half of the respondents in the 
NSSO survey without loans mentioned that getting a loan is very difficult.  About half of the loans to 
this sector came from specialized central financial institutions like the Small Industry Development 
                                                 
22 Using financial reports of around 2,000 public companies, the Reserve Bank of India finds that internal sources 
accounted for about 40% of total funds until 1999-2000, and then jumped to about 60%. They treat “provisions” as part 
of “internal sources”, while our data source, CMIE Prowess, includes it in “others” category.   
23 For example, Banerjee et al. (2004) estimate that, for profitable firms (mean profit Rs. 36,700) in India, an increase of 
Rs. 1,000 in lending (average loan size Rs. 86,800; not fixing other financing sources) causes an increase in annual profit 
of Rs. 756.13. This finding indicates that companies may enhance profits by borrowing more from the banks. 
24 See Voordeckers and Steijvers (2005) for the Belgian case, and see Poutziouris et al. (2005) for the situation in the 
U.K.  In the U.S., small firms also have difficulties in obtaining bank loans, but part of the funding slack has been 
provided by private equity (including angel financing and venture capital) and privately placed and public bonds (Berger 
and Udell 1995, 1998). 
25 “The Indian SME Sector” – A report by India Development Foundation and Indicus Analytics (March 2004).   21 
 
Bank of India (SIDBI) and state financial institutions (SFCs).  The average annual credit flow to the 
SSI during the late 1990s hovered between US$ 2.4 and 3.6 billion.     
It is important to point out that, while formal financing (equity and public/private debt 
through markets as well as through other means involving formal contracting) remains scarce and 
costly for firms in India’s SME sector (and in other emerging economies), informal and alternative 
financing sources can provide an effective (partial) substitute for formal channels and support the 
growth of these firms.  In Section V below, we provide firm-level evidence on formal and informal 
financing channels based on our own surveys of firms.  To summarize our findings in this section, 
with aggregate data (at industry-level) we first show that financing through internal and alternative 
channels provides the most important funding source for Indian firms.  We also find that the growth 
of the non-state sectors, in particular, the SSI sector which is part of the SME sector, has been the 
most impressive among all firms in India.   
IV.  Evidence on Listed Firms 
In this section, we focus on publicly listed and traded companies and examine their financing 
and investment decisions.  We also relate these firm characteristics to legal protection of investors in 
India, and examine whether these relations are different from firms studied in previous papers (LLS, 
1999; LLSV, 1997a, 2000b, 2002).  Before doing so, we first look at different types of listed firms 
and corporate governance mechanisms in listed firms. 
IV.1  Types of Listed Firms and Corporate Governance 
Although the majority of listed firms belong to non-state sectors, an important component of 
the listed Sector is partially privatized and listed state-owned enterprises, usually known as public 
sector undertakings (PSUs).  Privatization of PSUs has been a key element of India’s continuing 
economic reforms that began in 1991.  The repeatedly declared goal of the privatization process has   22 
 
been to reduce state shareholding in all PSUs, except defense, atomic energy and railways, to 26% or 
lower.  However, progress on this front has been extremely slow, largely owing to political 
opposition (see Gupta 2005).  By March 2001, the federal government had sold shares in 41 out of 
258 PSUs, of which in 39 cases the state still retained majority shareholding; the median 
“disinvestment” was only 16% of shares.  The disinvestments have taken various forms including 
sale of shares to domestic and foreign institutional investors and the public through open auctions, 
public offerings, and global depository receipts in international stock markets.  In most cases, the 
partial or complete privatization has involved listing of PSUs on major exchanges and active trading 
in these shares.
26   
Next, we briefly examine standard corporate governance mechanisms in the listed sector.  In 
the years since independence, with less developed stock markets, three national level development 
finance institutions together with the state financial corporations have been the main providers of 
long-term finance to companies.  Along with the government owned mutual fund company, the Unit 
Trust of India, they also held large blocks of shares in the companies that they lent to and invariably 
had board representations.  In this respect, the corporate governance system resembled the bank-
based German model.  The institutions were traditionally evaluated on the quantity rather than 
quality of their lending and thus had little incentive for effective monitoring.  Their nominee 
directors routinely served as rubber-stamps of the management of the day.  With their support, 
promoters of businesses in India could frequently enjoy managerial control with very little equity 
investment of their own.  This makes it relatively easy for the promoters and other insiders to recoup 
their investment in a short period by self-dealing and other strategies.
27  
                                                 
26 The Bombay Stock Exchange has a separate index, the BSE PSU index, consisting of 47 partially privatized public 
sector undertakings. On March 31, 2006, these 47 companies had a combined market capitalization of over 166 billion 
US dollars, accounting for just over 25% of the total Bombay Stock Exchange market capitalization. 
27 There is some evidence on the “tunneling” of funds from one group company to another.  Bertrand et al (2002) 
estimate that an industry shock leads to a 30% lower earnings increase for business group firms compared to stand-alone   23 
 
India’s formal bankruptcy and reorganization process is slow and inefficient.  This process is 
governed by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act.  Under this Act the Board for Industrial and 
Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) provides immediate protection from the creditors’ claims for at 
least four years.  Between 1987 and 1992, BIFR took well over two years on an average to decide on 
a case.  Since then, delay has roughly doubled.  Very few companies have emerged successfully 
from BIFR, and even for those that needed to be liquidated, the legal process takes over 10 years on 
an average, in many cases rendering the assets of the company practically worthless.  
Given this reality of the weak protection of creditors’ rights, it is hardly surprising that banks, 
flush with depositors’ funds, routinely decide to lend only to blue chip companies and park their 
funds in government securities.  Consistent with evidence of credit-constrained firms (Banerjee et al. 
2004), investments in government securities accounted for 37% of the total assets of Indian banks 
while advances accounted for 49%.  Indian companies are also marked by limited dispersion of 
shareholding.  Even as recently as 2002, the average shareholding of promoters in all Indian 
companies was as high as 48.1% (Topalova 2004).  In recent years, however, corporate governance 
has received considerable attention among investors, regulators and the media, and several initiatives 
to improve the level of corporate governance are being debated and adopted in India (see 
Chakrabarti 2006). 
As noted before, corruption and weak enforcement of corporate laws have corroded the level 
of actual protection despite extensive investor protection on the books.  The World Bank’s Report on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes, in its 2004 analysis of the observance of the OECD’s 
corporate governance codes in India, identified several areas for reform, while noting improvements 
since 2000.  These include developing deterrents to help align business practices with the legal and 
regulatory framework, in particular with respect to related party transactions and insider trading; 
                                                                                                                                                                   
firms in the same industry.  However, there is also evidence (e.g., Khanna and Palepu 2000) that firms associated with 
business groups have superior performance than stand-alone firms.   24 
 
changing the fragmented structure of regulatory agencies that give rise to regulatory arbitrage and 
weak enforcement; rules governing decision-making processes in corporate boards; and improving 
the role of institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity in forming and enforcing corporate 
governance policy, including voting and board representation. 
Finally, the market for corporate control in India is at an emerging stage.  Promoters typically 
maintain control of listed firms with relatively small shareholding given the support of lending 
institutions.  Hostile takeovers were not allowed by the Securities and Exchanges Board of India 
(SEBI) as recently as 1997.  There have been close to 600 public offers for corporate takeovers since 
then.  Nevertheless, regulations and the ownership structure of listed firms make it difficult for 
attempts at hostile acquisitions to succeed (e.g., Kripalani 2000; Vaidyanathan 2002). 
To summarize, despite extensive and strong investor protection on paper, actual protection of 
investors and standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak in the listed sector.  We provide 
a discussion of the role of alternative and informal governance mechanisms in Section V.6 below. 
IV.2  Empirical evidence on ownership, financing, dividend, and valuations of listed firms 
 
In this subsection, we examine and compare various characteristics of listed firms in India 
with those of other countries.  Our initial sample of 1,395 listed firms (panel data set for the period 
1995 to 2004) is collected and compiled from the CMIE Prowess database (same database for Table 
5 above).  There are four groups of listed firms in our sample (there are no PSUs in the sample).  
1.  Small manufacturing firms: SSI firms (definition in Section III); 
2.  Large manufacturing firms: Non-SSI or NSSI firms; 
3.  Small non-manufacturing firms: SSSBE firms (definition in Section III); 
4.  Large non-manufacturing firms: Non-SSSBE or NSSSBE firms. 
 
For each group of firms, data on financials, market variables, and ownership patterns were 
collected.  Due to missing data items, our final sample for most of our empirical tests consists of 854   25 
 
firms.  We first examine firms’ ownership structure.  Table 6-A compares the ownership structure of 
Indian firms to those from the LLS (1999) sample of over 1,000 firms from 27 countries (India not 
included), from the Claessens et al., (2000) sample of Asian firms (excluding Japan) and the AQQ 
(2005) sample of over 1,100 firms from China.  In 80% of the 854 listed firms in India, the largest 
shareholder (controlling shareholder) is the founder’s family or a different family or individual.
28  
Among 15% of the 854 firms, the largest shareholder is another corporation (or organization), and 
thus cross-holding is also a prevalent ownership pattern in India.  Since we do not have detailed 
information on the ownership patterns of the corporate owners, we do not know whether the 
corporate owners themselves are widely held or not.  However, given the fact that family 
(individual) ownership is prevalent among listed firms, it is reasonable to assume that these 
corporate owners are not widely held.  Only 1.76% of the 854 firms are widely held (i.e., no 
shareholder owns more than 10% of stocks).    
Our findings on ownership structure of India’s listed firms are similar to those of other Asian 
countries (e.g., Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002; and 
AQQ 2005).  The main result of LLS (1999) is that countries that protect minority shareholders 
poorly (strongly) tend to have more concentrated (dispersed) ownership.  Our evidence on India 
contradicts this hypothesis, in that despite India’s strong investor protection (by law) its ownership 
structure is close to other Asian countries (with family ownership) and countries with weak investor 
protection.  However, if we take into account India’s weak law enforcement and institutions (e.g., 
using the anti self-dealing index in DLLS 2005 and the revised creditor rights score in DMS 2005), 
then observed ownership structure is by and large consistent with the prediction of DLLS (2005). 
                                                 
28 Since we do not have detailed information on the identities of all the largest shareholders of these firms (e.g., whether 
they belong to the same family or a group of a few unrelated blockholders), our figure (80%) may be biased.  However, 
we are certain that the largest block of equity of these firms is not held by organizations, the government, or a large 
number of disperse shareholders.   26 
 
Table 6-B presents the summary statistics for a “snapshot” of the sample firms at the end of 
2004.  From Panel A, the average market cap of the full sample is US$16.98 million (median is US$ 
0.84 million), with the NSSI and NSSSBE firms significantly larger than the SSI and SSSBE firms.  
Panels B to G present key financial items such as earnings per share, net income, retained earnings, 
external financing through seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and long-term borrowings and 
dividend payout ratios for each group of sample firms.  For all firms in the sample, the retained 
earnings are very close to net income (Panels C and D), implying high internal re-investment rates.  
This is consistent with the finding from Table 5 that retained earnings constitute a vital source of 
financing.  Not surprisingly perhaps, NSSI firms seem to have more access to SEOs than other types 
of firms (Panel E).  Finally, the majority of our sample firms, in particular, small firms (SSI and 
SSSBE firms), did not pay dividends in 2004 (Panel G), while the fraction of dividend-paying firms 
is much higher among large firms (NSSI and NSSSBE firms) and these firms pay higher dividends.  
Table 6-C provides some evidence on external financing sources at the firm level.  The ratios 
for all the countries (except for India) in the table are taken from LLSV (1997a).
29  Indian firms rely 
much less on equity financing than LLSV firms: Both ratios of market capitalization to sales and to 
cash flow for the full sample of Indian firms are much lower than the average of LLSV firms and 
most of the LLSV subgroups of firms.  Among the four groups of Indian firms, large manufacturing 
firms (NSSI) rely least on equity financing, while small, non-manufacturing firms (SSSBE) rely 
most on equity financing.  On the other hand, Indian firms, in particular, large firms (NSSI and 
NSSSBE firms), rely more on debt financing (bank loans and bonds) than LLSV firms: Both ratios 
of debt to sales and to cash flow for the full sample of Indian firms are higher than all LLSV 
subgroups of firms.  When we combine equity and debt financing (sum of rows 1 and 3 or 2 and 4), 
                                                 
29 In LLSV (1997a), a ratio (e.g., market cap/sales) for a country is obtained by first finding the median of this ratio 
across firms within various industries, and then by taking the average of the medians across industries. Each ratio for 
LLSV countries in Table 6-C is the median of the ratios of countries with the same legal origin. For Indian firms, we 
follow the approach in AQQ (2005), who take the average ratios of all the sample firms in China.    27 
 
it appears that the listed Indian firms rely on external market and bank financing to a similar degree 
compared to their counterparts in LLSV countries.   
Next, we examine dividend policy and valuations of listed firms in India, and compare the 
results to those studied by LLSV (2000b, 2002).
30  Following LLSV (2000b, 2002), we use the 
summary statistical data from their papers to create a “synthetic firm” for each country in their 
sample, and use our own data on Indian firms to create the synthetic firm for India; we then compare 
the predicted values based on the LLSV model with the actual values of the synthetic Indian firm to 
examine the predictive power of the LLSV model.  Table 7 explains the details of the approach and 
presents regression results.  First, LLSV (2000b) find that firms in countries with poor protection of 
outside shareholders tend to have low dividend payout ratios due to severe agency problems.  This 
result is consistent with our findings, but the coefficients on low protection (dummy that equals 1 if 
the anti-director rights score is less than or equal to 3/6) and interaction between growth in sales and 
the low protection dummy from our regressions are not statistically significant.  Second, LLSV 
(2002) find that firms in countries with poor protection of outside shareholders tend to have low 
valuation, proxied by the Tobin’s Q (or lower market-to-book assets ratio).  This result is confirmed 
with our “synthetic firm” approach: We find that both the cash-flow rights (percentage of shares 
owned by the largest shareholder) and anti-director rights are positively correlated with firm 
valuations. 
We then investigate whether LLSV’s predictions on dividend and valuation apply to India’s 
synthetic firm.  First, India belongs to the high protection group, so that the LLSV model suggests 
that Indian firms should have high dividend payout: This is the case if we use dividend/sales as the 
proxy for payout ratio, because the prediction error of India’s synthetic firm (0.11) is smaller than 
the standard error of the regression residuals (2.16); but in terms of dividend/earnings ratio the 
                                                 
30 LLSV (2002) examine Tobin’s Q of 539 firms in 27 wealthy economies and India is excluded.  LLSV (2000) examine 
dividend policies of over 4,000 companies in 33 countries including India, but with only one Indian firm in the sample.    28 
 
LLSV prediction is incorrect as the prediction error is high (13.15 as compared to 11.84).  LLSV’s 
prediction on valuation is also incorrect as the prediction error of Tobin’s Q of India’s synthetic firm 
is high (0.75 vs. 0.32).     
In conclusion, our empirical analysis on the listed firms in India demonstrates that India does 
not conform precisely to LLSV’s predictions and findings on legal protection and firm 
characteristics.  However, considering that investor protection in India is poor in practice, our 
analysis is not inconsistent with the spirit of LLSV predictions.  With English common-law origin 
and strong investor protection by law but not in practice, India’s listed firms actually behave more 
like firms from countries with poor investor protection:  The equity ownership of Indian firms is 
highly concentrated within the founder’s family or the controlling (individual) shareholder; and they 
tend to pay lower dividend and have low valuations compared to companies from countries with 
strong legal protection.   
V.  Survey Evidence on India’s Small- and Medium-sized Firms 
In order to go beyond reported statistics and secondary financial information, and understand 
better the business realities and financing decisions of small and medium businesses in India at the 
ground level, we conducted a survey of SME enterprises in India.  Our surveys led to a number of 
interesting findings about the SME sector in India.  They reinforced the difficulty in obtaining 
external funds from formal channels, a point mentioned in Section III above.  What is perhaps an 
even more interesting finding is the role and importance of informal and alternative financing 
channels, as well as informal mechanisms in contract enforcement that characterize the environment 
in which these firms operate in India.   29 
 
V.1  Survey design and administration 
Our survey design focused on three broad areas: Corporate financing and investment, 
ownership structure and corporate governance, and law, institutions and business environment.  
Based on a review of survey-based papers in the law and finance area
31, we developed the survey 
questionnaire with special attention to the important issues in the semi-formal environment in which 
Indian SMEs operate, while trying to avoid biases induced by the questionnaire and maximizing the 
response rate.  The final version of the survey included 36 questions (most with subparts) in four 
sections.  The survey instrument and tabulated survey results (including the response rate for each 
question) are available at http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~rc166/India-survey.zip/.   
Given that the target of our survey are mostly small and private firms that are typically 
reluctant to reveal in writing their key financial and business information, the response rate is likely 
to be extremely low if we followed the mailed questionnaire method to administer the surveys.  
Further, the nature of our questions dealing with sensitive business information required us to ensure 
that the responses came from the owners or top executives of the surveyed units.  Consequently, we 
deployed graduate students as field investigators in Hyderabad and New Delhi under the supervision 
of researchers from the Center of Analytical Finance at the Indian School of Business, Hyderabad, to 
administer the questionnaire to each of the respondents in face-to-face interviews.  Our final sample 
consists of 136 SME units in and around New Delhi in North India and 76 SME units in and around 
the South Indian city of Hyderabad.
32  The sample spans several industries including engineering, 
chemicals, packaging and software.  The firms range in age from start-ups (less than one year old) to 
                                                 
31 These papers included DLLS (2003), McMillan and Woodruff (1999a, b), Johnson et al. (2002) and AQQ (2005). 
32 The firms were selected from several industrial parks in the New Delhi and Hyderabad areas that provided industrially 
diversified clusters of firms.  The clusters include the Mayapuri Industrial Area, Naraina Industrial Area, WHS 
Kirtinagar cluster in Delhi and Patanchera and Jeedimetla Industrial Development Areas (IDAs), the Katedan Industrial 
Estate and the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) Ancillary Industrial Estate at Ramachandrapuram in Hyderabad.  
Interviews were conducted with the owners or top level executives of the firms in the sample.  On average an interview 
took about 45 minutes to complete.  However, given the diversity of the business practices among the surveyed firms, a 
number of questions in the survey did not generate 100% response.   
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about 85-year old companies, with a more or less continuous distribution of firms started in the 1958 
to 2005 period.  Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for the firms in our survey.  
V.2  Financing an SME unit 
Figure 3 shows the relative importance of the various alternative sources of funds at the start-
up (Panel A) and growth (Panel B) phases.  In the start-up phase, family constitutes the “extremely 
important” source of funds for an overwhelming majority (over 85%) of the respondents.  Trade 
credits come next in importance, representing an “extremely important” source of funds for 27% of 
the respondents.  In comparison, bank loans from state – owned banks make up an “extremely 
important” source for 15%, and a “very important” source for about 17% of the firms surveyed.  The 
role of bank financing seems to be somewhat more important in our sample survey than in the NSSO 
survey discussed in Section III above, though the role of family connections remains supreme as in 
the NSSO survey.  In the growth phase too, most firms (86%) find family and friends to be the 
easiest and least expensive source of funds.  Again, as in the start – up phase, trade credits continue 
to be the next most important source.  For 52% of the respondents, trade credits are the easiest 
source of funds.  The importance of trade credits for SME firms is consistent with the importance of 
trade credits that we noted in section III above based on our analysis of secondary sources of 
financial information.   
Internal funds appear to constitute a crucial source of funds at the growth stage.  27% of the 
respondents said they invested between 75% and 100% of their net income in the business in the first 
year they made profits.  Again, the importance of internal sources underlined by the surveys is 
consistent with our analysis based on secondary sources of financial information in section III above. 
There are, however, some evident differences in bank credit availability within our sample.  
In the growth stage, short-term bank credit was an easy and inexpensive source for 45% of the 
respondents, while long-term bank credit was similarly viewed by 33%.  On the other hand, 22%   31 
 
(34%) of the respondents found short (long) term bank debt to be costly and difficult to get.  Clearly, 
not all firms have similar experience with bank credit.  Among the 199 respondents who answered 
the query, 22% had no bank/financial institution credit, while 48% had loans from only one 
institution.  Only 14% of the respondents had accounts with two banks or intermediaries, while only 
2% had loans from three institutions.  Evidently, the market for bank credit is highly “relationship-
driven,” reducing the bargaining power of the businesses vis-à-vis banks.  89% of the surveyed 
businesses with bank loans had borrowed from one or more state-owned banks, while 10% had loans 
outstanding from the SIDBI or SFCs (State Finance Corporations), specialized public sector 
institutions set up to finance growth of small industries.  State-owned banks and SIDBI/SFCs are 
also the preferred loan providers, with 87% of the respondents wanting to borrow from the state-
owned banks if possible and 4% wanting to borrow from the specialized institutions.  While 20% 
had loans from private sector banks/trusts/private credit agencies, none of the businesses surveyed 
had any loans from foreign banks.  2% of the respondents expressed the desire to borrow from a 
foreign bank if it were possible. 
Over 70% of the respondents said that they had to meet operating/profitability standards to 
obtain their largest loans.  In terms of transaction costs in obtaining bank loans, 40% of the 
respondents had their loans approved in less than a month, 32% had to wait between 1 and 2 months, 
18% had their loans approved between 2 to 3 months, and 10% had to wait even longer.  The median 
loan approval time, therefore, is 1-2 months.  As for bank monitoring of the borrowers, 27% of the 
respondents said that bank staff contacted them on a monthly basis to check their performance.  For 
43% of firms, the contacts were on a quarterly basis, while 21% had the contacts once in six months 
or less frequently.  2% said bank staff were actively involved with their projects, while 7% said they 
had never been contacted by their banks after the loan was disbursed.  Overall, the median 
monitoring of banks appears to be at the “once-a-quarter” level.  These results on bank financing for   32 
 
SME firms in India are in general consistent with those from other countries, including developed 
countries (see Peterson and Rajan 1994 and Berger and Udell 1995 for evidence on small firms in 
the U.S.).  
V.3  Ownership structure and corporate governance 
Our survey also sheds light on the organization, ownership pattern and corporate governance 
mechanisms in Indian firms.  In about 85% of the SMEs surveyed, the largest share block belonged 
to the founder and his (all firms in our sample had male founders) family.  Two companies (1%) had 
some foreign (including expatriate Indian) investment.  The remaining 14% firms had their largest 
share block held by the founder (and his family) jointly with unrelated partners.  About 70% of the 
businesses had unlimited liability.  When asked how the owner planned to protect personal assets in 
case of business failure, 96% of the respondents preferred negotiating with debtors for an extension;  
14% of these respondents also planned to file for personal bankruptcy.   
In terms of corporate governance, about 37% of all units surveyed that had non-owner CEOs 
(or equivalent), indicated that the CEOs enjoyed “little discretion” in their business decisions and 
had to consult the owners for most decisions.  The proportion of firms with CEOs with “no 
discretion” and “full discretion” were 13% and 8% respectively, while 43% indicated they had some 
to a lot of discretion and needed to consult the owners only in critical matters (the total exceeds 
100% owing to multiple answers in some cases).  Clearly there is not much separation between 
ownership and control in the typical SME environment, with the owner keeping a close watch over 
day-to-day functioning even with a hired CEO.  When asked about the possibility of an outsider 
buying up a firm’s assets in case of bad management, 57% thought it was “very likely”, with 22% 
considering it “somewhat likely” and 21% “not likely.”     33 
 
V.4  Law, institutions and business environment 
The picture that emerges of the SME sector from our surveys clearly indicates that the sector 
deals with widespread corruption and has little recourse to the legal system.  Informal mechanisms 
based on trust, reciprocity and reputation play a much more important role than legal remedies in 
settling disputes and enforcing contracts.  As for their dealings with the regulatory authorities, 
corruption is taken for granted as part of doing business.   
Over 80% of the firms we surveyed needed a license to start a business, and for about 47% 
obtaining the license was a difficult process.  In about two-thirds (63%) of the latter cases, the 
difficulty was caused by government officials.  Payment of bribes was the most frequent complaint.  
When asked how they thought other firms dealt with such problems, 87% of the respondents who 
answered said bribes were regularly paid.  The second most common response (about 23% of the 
respondents who answered this question) was using friends of government officials to negotiate for 
them.  Clearly, networks and connections are of crucial importance in negotiating the government 
bureaucracy. 
As for conducting day-to-day business, while the firms claimed not to function outside the 
scope of law, legal concerns are far less important to them than the demands and responsibilities of 
the informal networks within which they exist and function.  Panels A and B of Figure 4 show the 
mean score (on a scale of 1-3) of the importance attributed to the various consequences of non-
payment of dues and breach of contract respectively.  In the first type of violation involving default 
(Panel A), the primary concern is loss of reputation, followed closely by loss of property.  In the 
second type of violation (breach of contract; Panel B), loss of future business opportunities ranks the 
highest, followed by loss of reputation.  Significantly, in both types of violation, the fear of legal 
consequences (adverse court sentence or jail term) is the least important concern.  Even threat to 
personal safety ranks higher than legal consequences.  Clearly, violation of the “unwritten rules” of   34 
 
the informal networks in which these businesses operate can result in serious penalties including lost 
opportunities and physical harm, and they act as effective deterrents to outright dishonesty in 
business dealings.  Reputation and trust are pivotal for survival and growth in this environment.   
About 50% of the firms we surveyed do not have a regular legal adviser.  Of the other half 
that does, less than 50% of these firms have “legal advisors” with a law degree or a license to 
practice law.  When pressed for a reason, 63% of respondents who did not have legal advisors 
claimed they did not need lawyers as they knew all their business partners and could deal with them 
fairly.  Clearly, the formal legal system takes a back seat while reputation, trust and informal 
personal relationships are the driving factors in screening counter-parties to do business with.  When 
asked who would be the most helpful entity to turn to for mediation in a business dispute or to 
enforce a contract (Panel C of Figure 4), about 45% (the respondents were allowed more than one 
choice) of the respondents chose “mutual friends or business partners,” followed closely by “settling 
out of court with the help of legal advisers” (45%), while non-government organizations like trade 
associations came in third with 26%.  Only 20% of the respondents mentioned going to courts as the 
first option indicating that the legal system, while not as effective as the informal mechanisms, is not 
altogether absent.  When asked what a firm does to ensure payment or repayment (more than one 
response allowed), about 59%  replied that they would go to court leaving negotiation possibilities 
open,  while 53% said that they screen their borrowers/clients so well that such issues do not arise. 
12% asserted they would seize the defaulters’ personal assets themselves.  Clearly, the courts, while 
not the most popular method of conflict resolution, do have their utility as a negotiating tool.  
The informal system, however, is not perfect in resolving disputes and has its costs.  When 
asked whether in the past three years they experienced a breach of contract or non-payment with a 
supplier or major customer, over 48% of the respondents replied in the positive.  When asked further 
what they did about it (more than one answer allowed), 35% said they renegotiated while 43% said   35 
 
they did nothing but continued the business relationships with the defaulting parties.  One possible 
interpretation of this is that there are insurance mechanisms in place, including long-term profit 
sharing, so that firms do not care as much about short-term gains and losses.  Another interpretation 
is that the large and powerful firms can at times get away with violations.  Unfortunately, we are 
unable to distinguish between the possibilities. 
To summarize, the general image of the business environment of the SME sector based on 
our survey is characterized by the presence of strong informal mechanisms.  Family ties, reputation 
and trust are key elements in this environment.  Legal remedies are not altogether absent, but are far 
less important than the rules of the networks in which they operate.  Ownership and management are 
not effectively separated.  Consistent with this environment, external finance comes mostly from 
family and friends, followed by trade credits.  While some firms obtain bank credit others find it 
hard to get, indicating that bank loans are not made at arm’s length but are relationship driven. 
V.5  Comparison of survey findings in New Delhi and Hyderabad regions 
The SME units in the two regions were surveyed independently.  The surveys present a 
largely similar and consistent picture of SME financing and governance, inspiring confidence in our 
conclusions about the Indian business environment in general.  However, there are a few important 
differences.  For instance, trade credits appear to be far more important for the New Delhi 
respondents than for those in Hyderabad.  Further, the New Delhi firms appear to be comparatively 
more dependent on family and friends for funding in both start-up and growth stages.  On the other 
hand, bank loans seem to be more important for the Hyderabad firms.  However, bank loans seem to 
be disbursed sooner in Delhi (90% received their loans within 2 months) than in Hyderabad (52%).  
Reinvestment of a large proportion of profits, however, seems to be more prevalent among 
Hyderabad firms.    36 
 
In terms of corporate governance, the New Delhi firms are more often held closely by the 
founder’s family, have unlimited liability and seem to give greater discretion to CEOs.  The market 
for a firm’s assets seems to be more liquid in New Delhi too, with a significantly greater proportion 
of respondents believing that an outsider acquiring a firm’s assets in case of bad management “very 
likely.”  New Delhi firms tend to have “legal advisors” more often than Hyderabad firms, although 
the advisors are often not trained lawyers. 
V.6 Discussion 
In this subsection we discuss mechanisms supporting the growth of India’s small and 
medium firms.  We believe the most important reason for the growth is the effectiveness of 
alternative financing channels and informal governance mechanisms.  One of the most important 
informal mechanisms is reputation, trust and relationships.  Greif (1989, 1993) argues that certain 
traders’ organizations in the eleventh century were able to overcome problems of asymmetric 
information and the lack of legal and contract enforcement mechanisms, because they had developed 
institutions based on reputation, implicit contractual relations, and coalitions.  Spagnolo (1999) 
develops a model of social capital to show how social and business relationships can mutually 
reinforce each other. AQQ (2005) find that informal mechanisms have supported the growth of 
China’s Private Sector, and influenced how firms raise funds and contract with investors and 
business partners.  In addition, Greif (1994) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) point out the 
importance of cultural and religious beliefs in the development of institutions, legal origin, and 
investor protection.  These factors are of particular relevance and importance to India’s institutional 
development.  Despite the long British influence, India’s own rich culture and history have as much, 
if not stronger, impact on businesses and investors and their mutual interactions.  The importance of 
reputation, trust and relationships in India’s corporate sectors is reflected in our survey evidence, as 
well as in the software industry examined by Banerjee and Duflo (2000).    37 
 
We also find that other governance mechanisms have supported the growth of Indian firms.  
First, Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) link the degree of separation of ownership and control to 
different legal environments, and show that family-run (professionally managed) firms will emerge 
as the dominant form of ownership structure in countries with weak (strong) minority shareholder 
protection.  Our survey evidence in this section and empirical results on the listed firms in section IV 
above, along with similar evidence in other Asian countries, suggest that family firms are a norm in 
India and other Asian countries.  In fact, the combination of family firms and reputation-based 
informal mechanism may be one of the important factors behind the success of many family and 
group-based (listed and unlisted) firms in India (e.g., Khanna and Palepu 2000; Khanna and Yafeh 
2005; Gopalan et al. 2005) in spite of weak standard corporate governance mechanisms, as 
reputation concerns motivate all managers (affiliated with the founder’s family) and member firms 
to take actions that maximize firm/group value, which in turn benefit non-controlling shareholders as 
well.  Second, Allen and Gale (2000a) show that, if cooperation among different suppliers of inputs 
is necessary and all suppliers benefit from the firm doing well, then a good equilibrium with no 
external governance is possible, as internal, mutual monitoring can ensure the optimal outcome.  In 
section III and our survey of SME firms, we presented evidence on the importance of trade credits as 
a form of financing for firms in wholesale and retail industries.  Cooperation and mutual monitoring 
can ensure payments (as long as funds are available) among business partners and group-affiliated 
firms despite the lack of external monitoring and contract enforcement.  The importance of trade 
credits is also found in other emerging economies (e.g., survey-based results of Vietnamese firms in 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999a) and AQQ (2005) survey of Chinese firms), as well as in developed 
countries (see Berger and Udell 1998 for evidence on small firms in the U.S.).   
It is worth mentioning how entrepreneurs and investors alleviate and overcome problems 
associated with government corruption.  According to proponents of institutional development (e.g.,   38 
 
Rajan and Zingales 2003b; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), poor institutions, weak government and 
powerful elites should severely hinder India’s long-run economic growth.
33  However, our aggregate 
and disaggregate evidence shows that corruption has not prevented a high rate of growth for India’s 
firms, in particular, firms in the SME sector, where legal protection is perhaps weaker and problems 
of corruption worse compared to firms in other sectors.  Perhaps one of the most effective solutions 
for corruption for firms in this sector is the common goal of sharing high prospective profits.  This 
common goal can align interests of the investors and government officials with entrepreneurs and 
managers to overcome numerous obstacles.  Under this common goal in a multi-period setting, 
implicit contractual agreements and reputation can act as enforcement mechanisms to ensure that all 
parties, including government officials, fulfill their roles to make the firm successful.  Another 
potential effective solution for corruption is competition among local governments/bureaucrats from 
different regions within the same country.  Entrepreneurs can move from region to region to find the 
most supportive government officials for their private firms, which in turn motivates officials to lend 
“helping hands” rather than “grabbing hands,” or else there will be an outflow of profitable private 
businesses from the region.  This remedy should be typically available in a big country with multiple 
regions like India. 
Finally, in our surveys we find that the majority of entrepreneurs resolve disputes outside of 
courts, similar to survey results from other emerging countries (McMillan and Woodruff (1999a) 
survey of Vietnamese firms and AQQ (2005) survey of Chinese firms).  However, we do find that 
some Indian entrepreneurs and their business partners also rely to an extent on the legal system (e.g., 
courts) to resolve disputes and enforce contracts.  It is possible that, going forward, the legal system 
will plays a more important role in supporting the development of stock markets and attracting more 
foreign capital inflows.  In order for this to happen, we must consider the costs of improving the 
                                                 
33 In addition, LLSV (1999) find that governments in countries with French or socialist origins have lower quality (in 
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legal system, which vary significantly across countries.  With a small and homogenous economy, a 
country can adjust its legal and financial systems to the strengths of its economy more economically 
than a large country.  DMS (2005) find that, despite apparent significant economic benefits from 
reform, there is very little time variation of creditor rights over the past twenty-five years around the 
globe.  This suggests that the costs of improving the legal system are, in fact, very high for many 
countries.  On the other hand, the success of India’s SME sector demonstrates that alternative 
mechanisms have substituted for formal mechanisms based on legal protection and supported the 
growth of non-state, non-listed firms in large and diversified economies such as India.  It is possible 
that similar mechanisms/substitutes have also worked well in other countries, including developed 
countries (e.g., during their early stage of economic development when legal institutions were not as 
yet well developed). 
VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the legal and business environment surrounding various types of 
Indian firms and their financing channels and governance mechanisms, and compare our results to 
those from other countries.  Unlike many cross-country studies that focus on one or two dimensions 
of a country’s legal and financial systems, we study all aspects of the financial system in the second 
largest developing country and find that many results based on existing cross-country studies do not 
apply to India.  We also provide both aggregate and firm-level evidence.  Our paper thus 
complements cross-country studies and advances the understanding of growth mechanisms.   
With one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world, India is unique among 
the countries studied in the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature:  Despite its English 
common-law origin and British-style judicial system and democratic government, corruption within 
the legal system and government weakens legal protection of investors in practice.  Financing of 
firms has been dominated by internal and alternative sources of financing, while listed firms have   40 
 
concentrated ownership and low valuations and pay low dividends relative to firms from countries 
with strong legal protection.  
Our evidence also includes results from firm surveys of small- and medium-sized private 
firms, one of the most successful sectors in the Indian economy.  We find that alternative financing 
channels, such as internal financing and trade credits, provide the most important source of funds.  
We also find that entrepreneurs and investors rely more on informal governance mechanisms, such 
as those based on reputation, trust and relationships, than formal mechanisms (e.g., courts), to 
resolve disputes, overcome corruption and finance corporate growth.  Our results call for more 
within-country studies in other regions and countries if we seek to understand better how these 
informal mechanisms work where formal mechanisms are not available or work imperfectly.   41 
 
Appendix A: Brief description of our variables and their sources 
A.1. Creditor/Shareholder Rights Variables, (Tables 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, 2-D, and 2-E) 
 
Variables Description  Sources 
Legal origin  Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of 
each country. 
Reynolds & Flores (1989); 
LLSV(1997a, 1998) 
One share-one vote  1) Equals one if ordinary shares carry one vote per share, and zero 
otherwise; 2) equals one, when the law prohibits the existence of both 
multiple-voting and nonvoting ordinary shares and does not allow firms 
to set a maximum number of votes per shareholder irrespective of the 
number of shares owned, and zero otherwise.  
Company law or 
commercial code; 
LLSV(1997a, 1998) 
Proxy by mail 
allowed 
Equals one if shareholders can mail their proxy vote to the firm, and 
zero otherwise.  
Company law or 
commercial code; 
LLSV (1998) 
Shares not blocked 
before meeting 
Equals ones if firms cannot require shareholders to deposit their shares 
prior to a general shareholders’ meeting (to prevent selling shares), and 
zero otherwise. 
Company law or 





Equals one if shareholders can cast all their votes for one candidate to 
the board of directors (cumulative voting) or a mechanism of 
proportional representation in the board by which minority interests may 
name a proportional number of directors to the board is allowed, and 
zero otherwise.  






Equals one if minority shareholders have either a judicial venue to 
challenge the decisions of management or the assembly or the right to 
step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their 
shares when they object to certain fundamental changes (e.g., mergers 
and asset dispositions); equals zero otherwise. Minority shareholders are 
defined as those shareholders who own 10% of shares or less.  
Company law or 
commercial code; 
LLSV (1998) 
Preemptive rights  Equals one when grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new 
issues of stock, and this right can be waived only by a shareholders' 
vote; equals zero otherwise.  
Company law or 
commercial code; 
LLSV (1998) 
Percentage of share 




The minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting; ranges 
from 1% to 33%. 
Company law or 
commercial code; 
LLSV (1998) 
Antidirector rights  The index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are 
not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders' 
meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share 
capital that entitles a share- holder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders' meeting is less than or equal to 10% (the sample median); 
or, (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a 
shareholders' vote. The index ranges from zero to six. 
Company law or 
commercial code; 
LLSV (1998) 
Mandatory dividend  Equals the percentage of net income that the company law or 
commercial code requires firms to distribute as dividends among 
ordinary stockholders. It equals zero for countries without such a 
restriction. 






Equals one if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as 




No automatic stay 
on secured assets 
Equals one if the reorganization procedure does not impose an 
automatic stay on the assets of the firm on filing the reorganization 
Bankruptcy and 
reorganization laws; 
LLSV (1998)   42 
 
petition. Automatic stay prevents secured creditors from gaining 
possession of their security. It equals zero if such a restriction does exist 
in the law. 
Secured creditors 
first 
Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the 
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. 
Equals zero if non-secured creditors, such as the government and 






Equals 1 when an official appointed by the court, or by the creditors, is 
responsible for the operation of the business during reorganization. 
Equivalently, this variable equals one if the debtor does not keep the 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the 




Creditor rights  An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is formed by 
adding “one” when:  (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as 
creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) 
secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the 
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) 
secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that 
result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and, (4) the 
debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the 






The minimum percentage of total share capital mandated by corporate 
law to avoid the dissolution of an existing firm. It takes a value of zero 
for countries without such a restriction. 





The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in 
two types of judicial cases (collection of a bounced check and eviction 
of a non-paying tenant; we took the average of these two indexes) at 
lower-level civil trial courts, and is formed by adding up the following 
dummies: (i) professionals vs. laymen, (ii) written vs. oral elements, (iii) 
legal justification, (iv) statutory regulation of evidence, (v) control of 
superior review, (vi) engagement formalities, and (vii) independent 
procedural actions. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 0 means a 
lowest level and 7 means a higher level of control or intervention in the 
judicial process. 
Survey of judges and 




The index (and ranking) is based on the survey of businessman on 
whether corruption is prevalent in government and legal institutions 
when conducting business in a country. It ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 





The index of disclosure equals the arithmetic mean of scores on the 
disclosure requirements of: (1) Prospect; (2) Compensation; (3) 
Shareholders; (4) Inside ownership; (5) Contracts Irregular; (6) and 
Transactions;  each of them is a dummy variable. One means the 
disclosure of an item is required.  The Index ranges from zero to one, 
with zero meaning no disclosure requirement for anything, and one 




The aggregate score is the average rank across four measures of 
earnings management. Higher scores imply more earnings management 
and lower score implies less earnings management. 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 
(2003) 
Legality Index  Composite index measuring the effectiveness of legal institutions: Use 5 
legality proxies (each range from 0 to 10) from LLSV(1998) and 
principal components analysis to aggregate the individual legality 
proxies into a single Legality Index. The first component accounts for 
84.6 percent of the total variance, and is given by Legality = 
0.381*(Efficiency of Judiciary) + 0.578*(Rule of Law) + 
0.503*(Absence of Corruption) + 0.347*(Risk of Expropriation) + 
0.384*(Risk of Contract Repudiation). The index ranges from 0 to 21 
with a higher score meaning better legal environment. 
International Country Risk 
Guide; Berkowitz, Pistor, 
and Richard (2003)   43 
 
A.2. Financial System Variables, (Tables 3-B and 3-C) 
 
Variables Definition  Original  Source 
Bank Credit   Ratio of total credit deposited into banks from private 
sectors /GDP. 
IFS, WDI, and country specific 
publications 
(Total) value traded  
 
Ratio of domestic equity traded on domestic exchanges 
/GDP. 
 IFS, WDI, EMFB, and country 
specific publications  
Market 
capitalization  
Ratio of domestic equities listed on domestic 
exchanges/GDP. 
Int’l Financial Statistics (IFS), 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI), Emerging Markets 
Factbook (EMFB), and country 
specific publications 
Overhead cost  Overhead cost divided by total bank system assets.  Levine’s calculations (2002) 
Structure- size   Log(Market capitalization/Bank credit); measure size of 
markets and banks. 
Levine (2002) 
Structure-activity   Log(Value traded/Bank credit); measure size/trading 
volume of markets and banks.  
Levine (2002) 
Structure-efficiency   Log(Market capitalization ratio × Overhead cost ratio); 
measures relative efficiency of markets vs. banks. 
Levine (2002) 
Structure regulation  Sum of the four categories in regulatory restriction.  National regulatory authorities 
Regulatory 
restriction 
The degree to which commercial banks are allowed to 
engage in security, firm operation, insurance, and real 
estate: 1- unrestricted; 2-permit to conduct through 
subsidiary; 3-full range not permitted in subsidiaries; and 
4-strictly prohibited.  
National regulatory authorities 
Finance-size  Log (Market capitalization ratio + Private credit ratio)  Levine (2002) 
Finance-activity   Log (Total value traded ratio × Private credit ratio)  Levine (2002) 
Finance-efficiency   Log (Total value traded ratio/Overhead cost)  Levine (2002) 
 Secondary source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2002), and Levine (2002). 
 
 
A.3. External Financing Variables, (Table 3-B and Figure 2) 
 
Variable Description  Sources 
External cap 
/ GNP 
The ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to 
GNP in 1994. The first variable is computed as the product of the 
aggregate stock market capitalization and the average percentage 
of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the 
ten largest nonfinancial, privately- owned domestic firms in a 
given country. A firm is considered privately owned if the State is 





various country sources 
Domestic 
firms / Pop 
Ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to 
its population (in millions) in 1994. 
Emerging Market Factbook 
and World Development 
Report (WDR) 1996.  
 
IPOs/Pop  Ratio of the number of initial public offerings of equity in a given 




LatinFinance, GT Guide to 
World Equity Markets, and 
WDR 1996.  
Debt/GNP  Ratio of the sum of bank debt of the private sector and outstanding 




GDP growth  Average annual percent growth of per capita gross domestic 
product for the period 1970-1993.  
WDR 1995. 
Market cap/  The median ratio of the stock market capitalization held by  WorldScope.   44 
 
sales  minorities to sales in 1994 for all nonfinancial firms in a given 
country on the WorldScope database. Firm's stock market 
capitalization held by minorities is computed as the product of the 
stock market capitalization of the firm and the average percentage 
of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the 
ten largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given 
country. A firm is considered privately owned if the State is not a 
known shareholder in it.  
Market cap/ 
cash-flow 
The median ratio of the stock market capitalization held by 
minorities to cash flow in 1994 for all nonfinancial firms in a given 
country on the WorldScope database. The firm's stock market 
capitalization held by minorities is computed as the product of the 
stock market capitalization of the firm and the average percentage 
of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the 
ten largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given 
country. A firm is considered privately owned if the State is not a 
known shareholder in it.  
WorldScope. 
Debt/sales  Median of the total-debt-to-sales ratio in 1994 for all firms in a 




Median of the total-debt-to-cash-flow ratio for all firms in a given 
country on the WorldScope database.  
WorldScope. 
     Secondary source: LLSV(1998). 
 
 
A.4. Definitions of different types of firms and banks in India  
 
1.  Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs):  Companies with federal and/or state government as the majority or 
sole shareholder.  Includes partially privatized companies.  Different from departmental undertakings like 
railways that are non-corporate in organizational structure.  The government is the de facto owner, and they 
choose managers to run the firm.  
 
2.  Small and Medium Enterprises (SME):  Firms with less than Indian Rupees (Rs.) 50 million (about US$ 
1.11 million) in plant and machinery  at original cost.  Includes the small industry (less than Rs. 10 million or 
(about US$ 222,000) and the medium sector (Rs. 10-50 million). 
 
3.  Small Scale Industry (SSIs):  Firms with less than Rs. 10 million (about US$ 222,000) in plant and 
machinery at original cost and (mostly) engaged in manufacturing activity. 
 
4.  Small Scale Sector Business Enterprise (SSSBE):    Firms with less than Rs. 1 million (about US$22,000) in 
plant and machinery at original cost and  engaged in non-manufacturing activity. 
  
5.  Non-SSI (NSSI): A firm that is not an SSI. 
 
6.  Non-SSSBE (NSSSBE):  A firm that is not an SSSBE 
 
7.  Small Industry Development Bank of India (SIDBI):  Specialized financial institution (not a 
commercial bank) created by the government of India for financing and promoting growth in the small scale 
sector. 
 
8.  State Finance Corporations (SFCs):    State-level government financial institutions (not commercial banks) 
for financing and promoting growth, often in the small scale sector.   
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Table 1-A:  The Largest 20 Economies in the World: GDP and Growth 
 
Rank  GDP in 2005    GDP in 2005 using PPP* 










rate (%; 90-05) 
1  U. S.  12,452  5.2   U. S.  12,332  5.2
2 Japan  4,672  2.9   China  8,092  11.8
3 Germany  2,800  4.0   Japan  4,009  3.7
4 U.  K.  2,197  5.4   India 3,603 7.9
5 France  2,113  3.6   Germany  2,498  3.7
6 China  1,910  11.2   U.  K.  1,826  4.6
7 Italy  1,719  3.0   France  1,812  4.0
8 Spain  1,124  5.2   Italy  1,695  3.6
9 Canada  1,106  4.4   Russia  1,585  1.4
10 Korea  800  7.7   Brazil  1,553  4.6
11 Brazil  789  3.6   Canada  1,112  5.0
12 Russia  772  n/a   Korea  1,099  7.6
13 Mexico  758  7.4   Mexico  1,065  5.1
14  India 746  6.0  Spain  1,026  4.8
15 Australia  684  5.5   Indonesia  864  6.2
16 Netherlands  623  5.1   Australia  639  5.5
17 Belgium  365  4.2   Taiwan  630  7.4
18 Switzerland  365  2.9   Turkey  571  5.7
19 Sweden  354  2.6   Iran  560  6.8
20  Turkey 353  5.9   Thailand  559 6.9
 
Notes: *The PPP conversion factor is obtained from The World Bank Development Indicator (Table 5.6, World Bank. 
For details on how to calculate the indicator, see “Handbook of the International Program.” United Nations, New York, 
1992). 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2006.   50
Table 1-B: A Socio-economic Snapshot of India 
 
  Year  India  World 
Millions 2004  1,079.7  6,345.1   
Avg. annual % growth  2000-2004  1.5  1.2   Population 
Density people per sq. km  2004  363  49  
Billions of dollars  2004  674.6  39,833.6   Gross national 
income (GNI)  Per capita dollars  2004  620  6,280  
Billions of dollars  2004  3,347  55,584    GNI (PPP) 
Per capita dollars  2004  3,100  8,760  
Gross domestic product per capita % growth   2003-2004  5.4  2.9  
Life expectancy at birth (male; female)  2003  63; 64  65; 69  
Under-5 mortality rate per 1000  2003  87  84  
Adult literacy rate % of people 15 and above    1998-2004  61  82  
Carbon dioxide emissions Millions of tons  2000  1,070.9  22,994.5  
Population below $1 a day %  35.3  -- 
Population below $2 a day % 
1999-00 
80.6 -- 
Gini index  0.33  -- 
Lowest 20%  8.9  --  Percentage share of income or 
consumption  Highest 20% 
1999-00 
41.6 -- 
2001-2003 397  817  Agricultural productivity (Agr. Value added per 
agricultural worker 2000 dollars) 
2000-2002 401  1,051   
Agricultural 22  -- 




Household final cons. Expenditure % of GDP   2004  67  62  
General gov’t final cons. expenditure % of GDP   2004  11  17  
Gross capital formation % of GDP  2004  23  21  
External balance of goods and services % of GDP  2004  -1  0  
 
GDP implicit deflator Avg. annual % growth   2000-2004  3.9   -- 
Exports: (Millions USD)  72,530  9,122,837  Merchandise trade 
  Imports: (Millions USD) 
2004 
95,156 9,338,667 
Manufactured exports % of total merchandise exports  2003  77  77  
High technology exports % of manufactured exports  2003  5  18  
Current account balance (Million USD)  2004  6,853  -- 
Net private capital flows (Million USD)  2003  10,651  -- 
Foreign direct investment (Million USD)  2003  4,269  572,774  
Per Capita Official development assistance (USD)   2003  1  12  
Total Millions of dollars  2003  113,467  --  External debt 
Present value % of GNI  2003  19  -- 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)  2004  59.9  171.1 
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Table 2-A: India’s Position relative to the World Average: Law and Institutions 
 
Index India  World  Average 
 







Regulation of securities markets: 
b 
  
          Disclosure Requirements  0.92  0.60 
          Liability Standard  0.66  0.47 
          Supervisor characteristics (Independence)  0.33  0.45 
          Rule-making power  0.50  0.66 
          Investigative powers  1.00  0.60 
          Orders to issuers, distributors, accountants  0.67  0.38 
          Criminal Sanctions  0.83  0.50 
          Public enforcement  0.67  0.52 
 
Creditor rights and information sharing institutions: 
c 
  
         Creditor Rights (0- 4 scale)  4 (2)
c 1.79 
          Information Sharing institutions (binary: 0 or 1)  0  0.80 
 
Shareholder rights and Self-dealing: 
d 
  
          Anti-Director Rights (0 – 6 scale)  5  3.39 
          Anti-self-dealing Index (0 – 1, continuous)   0.55  0.46 
 
Regulation of labor: 
e 
  
           Employment laws index  0.44  0.49 
           Collective relations laws index  0.38  0.44 
            Social security laws index  0.40  0.57 
            Left of center political orientation (chief of largest party 
in  congress, 1928-1995) 
1.00 0.56 
    
 
Investment climate indicators: 
f 
  
          Starting a business – days (procedures)  89 (11)  50.8 (9.9) 
          Enforcing a contract – days (procedures)  425 (40)  388.3 (31.2) 
          Registering property – days (procedures)  67 (6)  81.4 (6.2) 
          Resolving insolvency – years   10  3.2 
          Investment profile (Country Risk)   8  8.8 
          Intensity of local competition  5.6  4.7 
          Transparency of government policymaking  4.1  3.9 
          Regional disparities of business environment   2.5  3.4 
    
 
a DLLS (2003);  
b LLS (2005a);  
c LLSV (1998) gave India a score of 4 out of 4 on creditor rights based on the 
Company Act (1956), while DMS (2005) lower this score to 2/4 based on the Sick Industrial Companies Act (1985) and 
assigned a score of 0 (out of 1) for information sharing agencies.   
d DLLS (2005);  
e Botero et al. (2004); 
f World Bank (2005). 
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No automatic stay on assets  0.72  0.26      0.67       0.25    0.49  1 
Secured creditors first paid  0.89  0.65  1   1    0.81  1 
Restrictions for going into 
reorganization 
0.72  0.42      0.33       0.75    0.55  1 
Management does not stay in 
reorganization 




















Legal reserve required as % of capital  0.01  0.21     0.41       0.16  0.15  0.00 
 
Notes: *=equals the sum of the scores of the four categories above, where 1 = Creditor protection is in the law, 0 
otherwise.  **: LLSV gave India a score of 4 out of 4 on creditor rights based on the Company Act (1956), while 
DMS (2005) lower this score to 2/4 based on the Sick Industrial Companies Act (1985); 
#=numbers in the bracket indicate percentage of countries in the sub-sample (excluding India where applicable) 
whose measure is equal to 4 (India’s measure). 
Source: LLSV countries – LLSV (1998); DMS (2005). 
 


















Proxy by mail allowed      0.39  0.05  0       0.25  0.18  0 
Shares not blocked before meeting  1  0.57      0.17  1  0.71  1 
Cumulative voting/ Proportional 
representation 
    0.28  0.29    0.3  0  0.27  1 
Oppressed minority     0.94  0.29    0.5  0  0.53  1 
Preemptive right to new issue     0.44  0.62      0.33       0.75  0.53  1 
Percentage of share capital to call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting 



















Mandatory dividend  0 0.11  0  0  0.05  0 
One share – one vote      0.17  0.29      0.33  0  0.22  0 
 
Notes: * is the sum of the scores on Rows (1), (2), (3),  (4), (5) and (6), where score =1, when the protection is in the 
law; 0 otherwise.  For Percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting, score =1 if the 
percentage of share capital ≤ 10%, 0 otherwise.  For the definitions of all other variables see Appendix A.1. 
#=numbers in the bracket indicate percentage of countries in the sub-sample (excluding India where applicable) whose 
measure is higher or equal to 5 (India’s measure). 
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Legal Formalism Index  2.72  3.99  3.42  3.11  3.23  3.42 
Corruption Perception Index  7.50  5.54  7.51  9.28  7.08  2.90 
Disclosure Requirement  0.85  0.54  0.63  0.56  0.71  0.92 
Earnings Management Score  4.14  18.72  21.46  9.81  11.98  19.10
Legality Index  15.56  13.11  15.53      16.42  14.98  11.35
     
    For definition of each of the variables, see Appendix A.1.  
Data sources: Legal Formalism Index, DLLS (2003); Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International 
(2005); Disclosure Requirement, LLS (2006); Earnings Management Score, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003); 
Legality Index, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003). 
 
 






















India (E)  2.9  5(2)  4 (2)  0.92 19.1  3.42  11.35 
China         3.2  3  2  N/a N/a  3.40  N/a 
Pakistan (E)  2.1  4  4  0.58 17.8  3.75  8.27 
S. Africa (E)  4.5  4  4  0.83 5.6  2.68  11.95 
Argentina (F)  2.8  4  1  0.50 N/a  5.44  10.31 
Brazil (F)  3.7  3  2  0.25 N/a  3.44  11.43 
Mexico (F)  3.5  0  0  0.58 N/a  4.76  10.79 
 
For definition of each of the variables, see Appendix A.1.   
Data sources: Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International (2005); Anti-director rights (also see Table 
2-C), LLSV (1998) and DLLS 2005; Creditor rights (also see Table 2-B), LLSV (1998) and DMS (2005); 
Disclosure Requirement, LLS (2006); Earnings Management Score, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003); Legal 
Formalism Index, DLLS (2003); Legality Index, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003).  
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Table 3-A.  Selected Indicators of India’s Financial System in 2003 
 
Measure of Financial Structure  India  World  Rank  N 
Deposit money bank vs. central bank assets  0.96  0.82  59  165 
Liquid liabilities to GDP  0.60  0.57  29  93 
Central Bank Assets to GDP  0.03  0.07  47  99 
Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP  0.51  0.60  47  106 
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP  0.31  0.50  53  105 
Bank deposits as a share of GDP  0.50  0.65  45  106 
Financial system deposits as a share of GDP  0.50  0.66  46  106 
Concentration in banking 
a 0.40  0.69  9  144 
Overhead Costs of banks (share of total assets)  0.02  0.05  35  142 
Net Interest Margin  0.03  0.05  87  140 
Life insurance penetration (volume/GDP)  0.02  0.03  30  59 
Non-life insurance penetration (volume/GDP)  0.01  0.02  57  59 
Stock market capitalization to GDP  0.34  0.45  41  89 
Stock market total value traded to GDP  0.48  0.28  22  87 
Stock market turnover ratio  1.39  0.50  6  92 
Private bond market capitalization to GDP  0.00  0.31  35  39 
Public bond market capitalization to GDP  0.29  0.38  24  43 
 
a Share of 3 largest banks in total assets of all commercial banks; Source: World Bank’s World Financial Structure.   
 
Table 3-B.   Comparing Financial Systems: Banks vs. Markets (Value-weighted approach) 
 















  Bank credit/GDP    0.62    0.55     0.99    0.49   0.73  0.31 
  Overhead cost/Bank total assets    0.04    0.05     0.02    0.03   0.03  0.02 
  Float supply of Market Cap/GDP   0.31    0.07     0.37    0.08   0.27  0.16 
Bank and market size  
  
  
     Market capitalization/GDP    0.58    0.18     0.55    0.25   0.47  0.34 
  Structure activity  -0.76  -2.03   -1.14  -1.83  -1.19  -0.66 
 Structure  size  -0.10  -1.05    -0.77  -0.69  -0.55  0.11 
  Structure efficiency  -4.69  -6.00   -5.17  -6.17  -5.17  -5.59 
Structure indices:  
Markets vs. banks
** 
  Structure regulatory   7.02   8.21  10.15  7.72   8.95  10 
 Finance  activity  -1.18  -3.38  -0.84  -2.86  -1.58  -3.03 
 Finance  size  0.69  0.47  0.75  0.55  0.65  -0.43 
Financial development 
(banking and market 
sectors)    Finance efficiency  2.18    0.44   2.85    1.04   2.01  1.90 
 
Notes: All the measures are taken from Levine (2002) or calculated from the World Bank Financial Database using 
the definitions in Levine (2002) (using 2003 figures for India); (see Appendix A.2 for list of definitions) 
*=the numerical results for countries of each legal origin group is calculated based on a value- (GDP of each country) 
weighted approach.  **=measuring whether a country’s financial system is market- or bank-dominated; the higher the 
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Table 3-C.  A Comparison of the Largest Stock Markets in the World (01/01-12/31, 2004) 
 







1 NYSE  12,707,578.3  55.8    89.8 
2 Tokyo  SE  3,557,674.4  56.9 97.1 
3 NASDAQ  3,532,912.0  59.3    124.8 
4 London  SE  2,865,243.2   82.2  116.6 
5 Euronext  2,441,261.4  68.8 115.0 
6 Osaka  SE  2,287,047.8  56.7 5.9 
7 Deutsche  Börse  1,194,516.8  73.2    67.9 
8 TSX  Group  1,177,517.6  63.1  66.2 
9  BME Spanish Exchanges   940,672.9  NA  57.7 
10 Hong  Kong  Exchange  861,462.9  78.6    39.7 
11 Swiss  Exchange  826,040.8  76.0 100.5 
12 Borsa  Italiana  789,562.6  61.9 134.9 
13 Australian  SE  776,402.8  79.8 81.1 
14  JSE South Africa   442,525.5  53.8 47.2 
15  Taiwan SE Corp.  441,435.8  60.6 177.3 
16 Korea  Exchange  389,473.4  74.5 147.2 
17  BSE, The SE Mumbai  386,321.1  89.2 43.1 
18 OMX  Stockholm  SE  376,781.1  64.7 130.5 
19 NSE  –  India  363,276.0  66.7 101.5 
20 Sao  Paulo  SE  330,346.6  62.0 43.0 
21  Shanghai SE (China)  314,315.7  46.0 87.0 
22 Singapore  Exchange  217,617.8  68.3 60.8 
 
Notes: 
1.  All figures are from http//:www.fibv.com, the web site of the international organization of stock exchanges.  
2.  Concentration is the fraction of total turnover of an exchange within a year coming from the turnover of the 
companies with the largest market cap (top 5%).  
3.  Turnover velocity is the total turnover for the year expressed as a percentage of the total market capitalization. 
















External capital/GNP   0.60      0.21      0.46     0.30    0.40  0.31 
Domestic firms/Pop  35.45    10.00    16.79   27.26  21.59  7.79 
IPOs/Population    2.23     0.19     0.12     2.14    1.02  1.24 
Total debt/GNP    0.68     0.45     0.97     0.57    0.59  0.29 
GDP growth (1-year)   4.30     3.18    5.29     2.42    3.79  4.34 
Rule of law    6.46     6.05     8.68   10.00    6.85  4.17 
Anti-director rights    3.39     1.76     2.00    2.50    2.44  5 
One share - one vote    0.22    0.24     0.33    0.00    0.22  0 
Creditor rights    3.11    1.58     2.33    2.00    2.30  4 
    
Sources:  LLSV (1997a). 
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Table 3-E.  A Comparison of Non-performing Loans of Banking Systems 
 
  1997  1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 
China  N/a    2.0  (2.2)    9.5  (10.6)  18.9  (24.9)  16.9 (22.7)  12.6 (15.2) 
Hong Kong  1.3 (3.0)  4.3 (10.2)    6.3  (13.9)    5.2  (12.6)    4.9 (12.9)    3.7   (9.6) 
India  n/a  7.8  (1.6)    7.0    (1.6)    6.6    (1.6)    4.6   (1.7)    2.2   (0.8) 
Indonesia   0.3 (0.2)  11.8  (4.6)    8.1    (2.0)  13.6  (3.2)    9.9   (2.2)    4.5   (0.9) 
Japan   2.7 (5.4)   5.1  (10.8)    5.3  (10.9)    5.8  (11.5)    9.2 (15.3)    7.4 (12.8) 
South Korea  2.9 (5.1)  4.8  (6.3)  12.9  (12.9)    8.0  (8.6)    3.4   (3.4)    2.5   (2.6) 
Taiwan   2.4 (3.2)  3.0  (3.9)    4.0    (5.7)    5.2  (7.6)    6.2   (9.4)    4.1   (5.2) 
 
Notes: NPL is measured as % of total loans made, and as % of GDP (numbers in brackets). Both the loan and NPL 




Table 3-F.  A Cross-country Comparison of Banking System Profitability 
 
The profitability is measured as the return on average equity (ROAE), and return on average assets (ROAA). The 
latter is presented in the brackets. 
 
 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
China   6.6   (0.2)   4.0    (0.2)    3.2  (0.18)    3.9 (0.2)  3.5  (0.2)    4.16   (0.2) 
Hong Kong  18.7   (1.8)  11.0   (1.0)  18.2   (1.6)  18.8 (1.6)  15.7  (1.4)   15.6   (1.4) 
India  17.0   (0.9)    9.7   (0.5)  14.2   (0.7)   0.9  (0.5)  19.2  (0.9)   19.6   (1.0) 
Indonesia  -3.8  (-0.3)   N/a    N/a  15.9 (0.3)    9.7  (0.6)   21.1   (1.4) 
Japan  -18.6(-0.6)  -19.2(-0.7)    2.7   (0.1)  -0.7 (0.0)  -10.4 (-0.5)  -14.5   (-0.6) 
South Korea  -12.5(-0.6)  -80.4(-3.0)  -34.0 (-1.5)  -7.0(-0.3)  15.8  (0.7)   13.1  (0.6) 
Taiwan   11.2  (0.9)     9.5  (0.8)     6.9  (0.6)     5.1(0.4)   4.0  (0.3)   -5.2  (-0.4) 
 
Source: The Asian Banker data center 2003, http://www.theasianbanker.com.  57
Table 4. 
Comparing the State and Non-state Sectors: 1990-2003 (in US$ billions) 
   State Sector Non-State  Sectors 
  
  
Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) 
  
Non-state corporations
*           












































1990-91 1.16  15.26  19.06  --  20.03  200.97 5.53  7.68  1,948  --  49.96  12.53  96.19 
1991-92 1.17  17.45  19.21  --  24.94  223.29 6.51  7.85  2,082  --  57.23  12.98  156.26 
1992-93 1.18  18.90  19.33  --  28.10  249.18 8.72  7.85  2,246  --  68.29  13.41  126.56 
1993-94 1.19  19.28  19.45  83.80  33.25  274.47  10.49  7.93  2,388  1.13  77.04  13.94  140.84 
1994-95 --  --  19.47  98.18  35.85  304.42  14.79  8.06  2,571  1.30  95.19  14.66  169.13 
1995-96 1.20  21.91  19.43  115.26  39.16  352.09  18.75  8.51  2,658  1.48  108.42  15.26  194.04 
1996-97 1.22  21.68  19.56  115.57  37.75  407.93  24.54  8.69  2,803  1.54  116.02  16.00  210.40 
1997-98 1.22  22.69  19.42  122.48  41.11  449.73  28.58  8.75  2,944  1.63  124.48  16.72  222.72 
1998-99 1.22  21.15  19.41  119.92  43.88  483.28  30.59  8.70  3,080  2.05  123.76  17.16  223.54 
1999-00 1.23  22.14  19.31  141.65  43.15  510.76  38.64  8.65  3,212  1.68  132.21  17.85  248.86 
2000-01 1.24  21.43  19.14  155.97  43.55  541.19  42.90  8.65  3,312  1.74  139.88  18.56  265.68 
2001-02 1.27  21.87  18.77  157.85  51.22  567.83  49.67  8.43  3,442  1.77  144.74  19.22  276.50 
2002-03 1.26  22.71  18.58  174.64  64.41  587.99  57.26  8.42  3,572  1.87  153.32  19.97  302.94 
CAGR  0.70  3.37 -0.21 8.50  10.22  9.36  21.51 0.77  5.18 5.77 9.80  3.96  10.03 
 
Notes:  All (nominal) figures are in US$ billions (inflation during this period was low and not volatile), with conversions made at average exchange rates during 
each year.  
*: These include all listed and unlisted (but registered) companies that are larger than firms in the SSI sector;  
**: Including both registered and unregistered small scale firms;  
a: Paid-up capital is what the investors actually have paid for the share capital, and equals the sum of face value and share premium; for PSUs, equity investors 
include the government and non-government investors, while for non-state (public and private) firms paid-up capital includes equity capital raised from the stock 
market (for listed firms) and private equity; 
b: Output and GDP figures exclude agriculture; 
c: Total (non-agriculture) GDP generated from all non-state sector 
firms; 
d: Includes labor force from both registered and unregistered firms but not all SSI firms in the unorganized sector.   
 
Source: India-Stat, Central Statistical Organization and the Reserve Bank of India.   58
Table 5.  Sources of (New) Funds for Non-financial Firms (percentage of total funding; 1990-2004) 
This table provides evidence on the sources of (new) funds for non-financial Indian firms during the 14-year period of 1991-2004, based on the 
Prowess database of CMIE.  The firm categories (among the firms in the non-state sectors) are not always mutually exclusive. The table shows the 
breakdown between listed and unlisted firms, and, in the small-scale sector, between manufacturing (SSI) and services (SSSBE) sectors.  For a 
particular firm category, the reported percentages of total funding are obtained by first calculating the percentage of total new funding in a given 
year for each funding source and then by taking the average from 1990-91 through 2003-04. 
 
Non – state sectors 
Sources of Funds  All Firms 
State 
Sector  Overall Listed Unlisted SSI  SSSBE 
Internal Sources  36.3  42.0  33.1  35.0  28.8  6.4  12.5 
              
Capital markets (broadly defined)
* of which  17.8  12.6  20.9  20.0  22.4  31.2  28.6 
      Equity  13.3  8.5  16.1  15.7  16.6  29.2  27.7 
      Debt  4.5  4.1  4.8  4.3  5.8  2  0.9 
              
Banks/Financial Institutions  15.9  11.5  19.0  19.7  17.3  9.4  -8.7 
Group Companies/Promoters/Directors  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.3  1.3  2.1  1.0 
Others (including current liabilities & provisions)  29.1 32.7 26.3  25.0  30.3 50.9  66.6 
 
Notes: 
*: Fund flows from Capital Markets: 1) Capital markets include both primary and secondary markets for listed firms (issuance of both equity and 
bonds), while debt also includes privately placed bonds; 2) for firms in the State Sector (PSUs), equity includes (new) share capital raised from the 
government and non-government investors (including new equity capital raised from the stock market if an PSU is also publicly listed and traded; 
3) for non-state, non-listed firms, these categories (equity and debt) indicate private equity and debt. 
 
Source: The source of the data is Prowess database compiled by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE).  CMIE is a Mumbai-based 
economic and business information and research organization.  Prowess database provides financial statements, ratio analysis, funds flows, 
product profiles, returns and risks on the stock markets, etc., of over 9,000 Indian companies. 
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Table 6-A.   Comparing Ownership Structure of Listed Firms. 
 
Panels A and B are taken from LLS (1999).  The first row in Panel C is the average of the Asian countries (excluding 
Japan) examined in Claessens et al. (2000).  The second row is the average of Chinese firms in Allen, Qian and Qian 
(2005). Our sample of 854 listed firms from India (panel data set for the period 1995 to 2004) is collected and compiled 
from the CMIE Prowess database. The average ownership structures during 2001-2004 are presented in the last 5 rows 




















Panel A:  
LLS (1999)  sample of large firms    
High-antidirector average   34.2 15.8 30.4  5.0 5.8
Low-antidirector average   16.0 23.7 38.3  11.0 2.0
Sample average   24.0 20.2 34.8  8.3 3.7
   
Panel B:  
LLS (1999) sample of medium firms    
High-antidirector average   16.7 10.3 50.9  5.8 1.7
Low-antidirector average   6.0 20.9 53.8  6.7 2.7
Sample average   10.7 16.2 52.5  6.3 2.2
   
Panel C:  
Asian firms    
Asia (no Japan, Claessens et al., 2000)   3.1 9.4 59.4  9.7 18.6
China (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005)   0.4 60.0 13.6  1.8 24.2 
            
Panel D:  NRI/OCB
**              a               b                 c
India full sample  3.8 1.8 0.3 81.1 0.2 15.4
Small manufacturing firms, SSI  1.2 0.2 0.0 83.8  0.0 14.7
Larger manufacturing firms, NSSI  11.5 3.2 0.6 85.9  0.6 7.3
Small non-manufacturing firms, SSSBE   0.4 2.3 0.0 74.7  0.0 22.5
Large  non-manufacturing firms, NSSSBE  1.2 1.2 0.7 79.1  0.0 17.8
 
Notes:  
*: We list these “controlling shareholders” (% indicate fraction of sample firms having a particular type of controlling 
shareholder): 1) “Widely-held’’ firms are defined as no single large shareholder owns more than 10% of shares; 2) 
“State” firms are those with the controlling shareholder being the state/government; 3) “Family” firms are those with the 
controlling shareholder being the founder’s family;  4) “Widely-held financial” (“Widely-held corporation”) are those 
firms with the controlling shareholder being a widely-held financial company (widely-held corporation). 
**: Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) are individuals of Indian nationality or Indian origin resident outside India.  Overseas 
Corporate Bodies (OCBs) include overseas companies, partnership firms, societies and other corporate bodies which are 
owned predominantly (at least 60%) by individuals of Indian nationality or Indian origin resident outside India.  
a: For these Indian firms, we identify the dominant shareholder to be private block-holders, but we are not sure how 
many blockholders there are and whether they are related or not.  
b: For these Indian firms, we identify the dominant shareholder to be a financial company, but we are not sure whether 
the financial company is widely held or not. 
c: For these Indian firms, we identify the dominant shareholder to be another listed and traded corporation, but we are 
not sure whether this corporation is widely held or not.   60 
 
 
Table 6-B.  Summary Statistics of Financial Items of Listed Firms (as of December 2004) 
 
Our sample of 854 listed firms from India (panel data set of 1995 to 2004; no PSUs) is collected and compiled from the 
CMIE Prowess database.  This table summarizes key financial items of these listed firms at Dec 2004.  
  Mean Median Min Max  Std. Dev # of obs.
Panel A: Market capitalization (US$ million) 
Full sample  16.98 0.84 0.00 731.53  70.10 520
Small manufacturing firms, SSI  1.27 0.51 0.00 21.85  2.70 122
Large manufacturing firms, NSSI  26.88 2.92 0.05 604.36  81.59 191
Small non-manufacturing firms, SSSBE   3.10 0.32 0.00 114.04  12.38 105
Large non-manufacturing firms, NSSSBE 29.52 1.14 0.06 731.53  105.00 102
Panel B: EPS (US$) 
Full sample  0.07 0.012 -1.32 1.95  0.26 505
Small manufacturing firms, SSI  0.01 0.001 -1.17 1.07  0.17 122
Large manufacturing firms, NSSI  0.12 0.051 -1.32 1.95  0.33 187
Small non-manufacturing firms, SSSBE   0.03 0.006 -0.32 0.79  0.12 94
Large non-manufacturing firms, NSSSBE 0.10 0.014 -0.36 1.43  0.30 102
Panel C: Net income (US$ million) 
Full sample  1.60 0.022 -40.98 164.17  10.89 827
Small manufacturing firms, SSI  0.01 0.004 -2.09 1.08  0.28 195
Large manufacturing firms, NSSI  3.60 0.298 -40.98 164.17  17.14 222
Small non-manufacturing firms, SSSBE   0.04 0.011 -10.10 3.17  0.82 228
Large non-manufacturing firms, NSSSBE 2.68 0.011 -2.85 120.37  12.64 182
Panel D: Retained earnings (US$ million) 
Full sample  9.49 0.11 -409.80 1006.71  69.16 827
Small manufacturing firms, SSI  -0.01 0.02 -20.93 10.84  2.71 195
Large manufacturing firms, NSSI  20.49 1.44 -409.80 1006.71  102.84  222
Small non-manufacturing firms, SSSBE   0.16 0.07 -101.04 26.60  8.09 217
Large non-manufacturing firms, NSSSBE 16.93 0.07 -28.47 781.38  89.09 193
Panel E: Proceeds from stock sales (US$ million) 
Full sample  0.69 0.00 -16.67 103.78  5.62 826 (71)
a
Small manufacturing firms, SSI  0.20 0.00 -0.98 18.09  1.64 195 (12)
 a
Large manufacturing firms, NSSI  1.91 0.00 -16.67 103.78  10.00 222 (46)
 a
Small non-manufacturing firms, SSSBE   0.51 0.00 -0.78 46.96  3.80 216 (12)
 a
Large non-manufacturing firms, NSSSBE 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.49  0.11 193  (1)
 a
Panel F: Proceeds from Long term borrowing (US$ million) 
Full sample  7.47 0.00 -1.20 1107.38  62.93 826 (188)
 a
Small manufacturing firms, SSI  0.60 0.00 -0.18 34.71  3.18 195 (34)
 a
Large manufacturing firms, NSSI  23.58 0.00 0.00 1107.38  118.73 222 (89)
 a
Small non-manufacturing firms, SSSBE   1.44 0.00 -1.20 182.78  13.24 216 (29)
 a
Large non-manufacturing firms, NSSSBE  2.64 0.00 0.00 111.11 12.98 193  (36)
 a
Panel G: Dividend Payout Ratio (dividend payment over Profits after Taxes; %) 
Full sample  8.40 0.00 -12.00 220.00  22.00 772 (157)
 a
Small manufacturing firms, SSI  5.60 0.00 0.00 220.00  24.00 184 (17)
 a
Large manufacturing firms, NSSI  14.50 0.00 0.00 151.00  26.00 223 (85)
 a
Small non-manufacturing firms, SSSBE   2.70 0.00 -2.00 100.00  13.00 210 (15)
 a
Large non-manufacturing firms, NSSSBE  10.00 0.00 -12.00 102.00 22.00 164  (40)
 a
 
a: Number of none-zero observations.  The calculations are based on an exchange rate of US $ 1 = 45 Rupees.   61 
 
 
Table 6-C.  External Funding at Firm Level 
 


















SSI  NSSI SSSBE NSSS 
BE 
Market cap/sales   0.69   0.51   0.63  0.37  0.58  0.41  0.63  0.05  3.42  0.73 
Market cap/cash flow   5.16   3.85   7.48  3.25  4.77  3.03  6.05  0.55  12.6  2.85 
Debt/sales   0.26   0.27   0.3  0.28  0.27  0.47  0.32  0.53  0.50  0.58 
Debt/cash flow   2.01   2.06   3.18  2.42  2.24  3.53 2.96  4.17  2.14  2.95 
 
Sources: LLSV countries— LLSV (1997a); Indian firms: 854 listed firms (panel data set for the period 1995 to 2004) are from the 
CMIE Prowess database, with each ratio being the mean of the pooled panel of firms during the same time period. 
 
Table 7.  Empirical Tests on Listed Firms in India and Other Countries 
 
Data: Our sample of 854 listed firms from India (panel data set for the period 1995 to 2004) is collected and compiled from 
the CMIE Prowess database.  We compare these India firms with other firms studied in LLSV (2000b, 2002; 4,103 firms from 
33 countries during the 1989–1994 period, and India was included).  We do not have detailed firm-level data for LLSV 
samples, but we do have: (1) the cross-sectional summary statistics by country; (2) the regression results across countries.  
Empirical Methodologies:  Step 1: Using the summary statistics from LLSV samples, we create a ‘‘synthetic firm’’ for each 
of the 33 countries. For this synthetic firm, each firm characteristic is equal to the median of the same variable across all the 
firms in that country.  Step 2: Three OLS regressions are run on the 33 (LLSV countries) ‘‘synthetic’’ observations. The 
dependent variables in these tests are: (1) dividend/earnings ratio; (2) dividend/sales ratio; and, (3) Tobin’s Q (measured by 
market-to-book assets ratio). The independent variables are the same ones used in LLSV (2000b, 2002). Based on the results 
from each of the three regressions. Step 3: Since India is included in the LLSV sample, we compare the predicted in-sample-
prediction on India’s synthetic firm with its true observation in LLSV to see whether India is an outlier, by examining the 
residuals from the regression.  
 
The following table presents the coefficients estimates, t ratios, prediction error, and standard errors of the residuals from the 
regression on 33 synthetic firms for dividend policy and 27 synthetic firms for valuation analysis. For the valuation analysis, 
the prediction on India is an out-of-sample prediction.  
Panel A: Payout  Dividend/earnings Dividend/sales  Panel B: Valuation  Tobin’s Q 
Intercept   42.44  1.30  Intercept   -0.58 
  (3.79 )  (0.64)    (-0.58) 
Civil law dummy  3.42  -1.06  Growth in sales  0.00 
  (0.33) (-0.56)    (0.17) 
Low protection dummy  -9.09 1.57  Common  law  0.30 
  (-0.91) (0.86)    (0.30) 
Growth in Sales  0.47 0.16  Anti-director  rights  0.65 
  (0.72) (1.36)    (1.81) 
GS * Civil law dummy   -1.12  0.00  Cash Flow rights  5.87 
  (-1.18) (0.00)    (1.89) 
GS*Low protection dummy  0.86 -0.20  CF rights * Common Law  -0.52 
  (0.89) (-1.13)    (-0.15) 
Div tax advantage  -10.54 0.25  CF rights * Anti-director  -2.12 
  (-0.85) (0.11)    (-1.78) 
R-squared  0.16 0.09  R-square  0.39 
No of observations   33 33  No of observations   27 
Residuals of India  13.15  0.11  Residuals of India  0.75 
Standard error of residuals  11.84 2.16  Standard error of the residuals  0.32   62 
 
 
Table 8:  Survey Firms – Descriptive Statistics 
 
The firms in the sample were selected from several industrial parks in the New Delhi (northern India) and Hyderabad 
(southern India) areas that provided industrially diversified clusters of firms.  The clusters include the Mayapuri 
Industrial Area, Naraina Industrial Area, WHS Kirtinagar cluster in Delhi and Patanchera and Jeedimetla Industrial 
Development Areas (IDAs), the Katedan Industrial Estate and the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) Ancillary 
Industrial Estate at Ramachandrapuram in Hyderabad.  Interviews were conducted with the owners or top level 
executives of the firms in the sample.  On an average an interview took about 45 minutes to complete.  The survey 
contained 36 questions (most with subparts) in four sections.  The survey instrument as well as tabulated results are 
available at http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~rc166/India-survey.zip/. 
 
  New Delhi  Hyderabad  Combined 
Number of Observations* 136  76  212 
 
Max. 85  38 85 
Median 21  11  19  Firm Age (years) 
Min.  < 1  < 1  < 1 
Max.  1.1 to 3.3   0.222 to 1.1  1.1 to 3.3 
Median  0.222 to 1.1  < 0.222  0.222 to 1.1  Total Assets (US$ million) 
Min. <  0.222  < 0.222  < 0.222 
Max.  > 0.222  > 0.222  > 0.222 
Median  0.0555 to 0.111  0.0555 to 0.111  0.0555 to 0.111   
Sales (US$ million) 
Min.  < 0.0555  < 0.0555  < 0.0555 
Max. 350  50 350 
Median 10  20  10  Number of employees 
Min. 2  7  2 
 


























































The Y-axis represents the buy-and-hold return of $1 investment in December 1992, and the X-axis represents the time 
period.  Returns of five indices are compared:  They are BSE-India (Bombay Sensex), SSE-China (Shanghai), S&P 500, 
FTSE-London, and Nikkei-Japan. The Sample period is from December 1992 to March 2006.    
 











































Figure 2 compares India’s legal system and external financial markets to those of LLSV countries (LLSV, 1997a, 1998) 
and China. Following LLSV (1997a, 1998), the score on the horizontal axis measures overall investor protection in a 
country. It is the sum of (overall) creditor rights, shareholder rights, rule of law, and government corruption. The 
vertical axis measures the (relative) size and efficiency of that country’s external markets. The score of a country 
measures the distance of the country’s overall external markets score (external cap/GNP, domestic firms/Pop, IPOs/Pop, 
Debt/GNP, and Log GNP) to the mean of all countries, with a positive (negative) figure indicating that this country’s 
overall score is higher (lower) than the mean. 
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Figure 3.  Financing Channels for Survey Firms 
 
Panel A 






















































































































































































































Of Little Importance 
 
Panel B 

































































Very easy and low cost
Relatively easy and moderate costs
Difficult and costly
Extremely difficult and costly
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New Delhi Hyderabad Overall
































































































































































































































New Delhi Hyderabad Overall
 
 
 